

AD-A285 735




NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS



DRUG AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEXICO-US
RELATIONSHIP

by

Joaquin Garcia Silva

June, 1994

Principal Advisor:

Thomas Bruneau

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

141A
94-32945



94 10 11 03 7

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188), Washington, DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave Blank)		2. REPORT DATE June, 1994	3. REPORT TYPE Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE DRUG AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEXICO-US RELATIONSHIP			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) Garcia Silva, Joaquin				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION	
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (Maximum 200 words) This thesis investigates the relationship between Mexico and the United States, specifically in terms of the impact of ongoing trends in drug smuggling and illegal immigration. The work begins with a review of the historical development process in each country, a discussion of the meaning of the border relationship, and the placement of drug trafficking and immigration issues within their current contexts. Following this introduction to the issues, drug trafficking and immigration are each explored in depth. The research effort concludes that economic motivations are at the root of problems stemming from the issues of drug trafficking and immigration, and that the traditional paradigms of the Mexico-US relationship, as well as a profusion of political finger-pointing, prohibit it from evolving into the partnership necessary for the continued development and prosperity of the two countries. Recommendations include acknowledging the historical and cultural differences at work in the countries, an admonition against US internal involvement in Mexico, and several more specific recommendations for dealing with the problems of drugs and immigration that were identified during the research.				
14. SUBJECT TERMS			16. PRICE CODE	
			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 142	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

DRUG AND IMMIGRATION ISSUES IN THE MEXICO-US RELATIONSHIP

by

Joaquin Garcia Silva
Captain, Mexican Navy
BS, *Hca. Escuela Naval*, 1971

Submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN INTERNATIONAL RESOURCE PLANNING AND
MANAGEMENT

from the


NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

June, 1994

Author: _____



Joaquin Garcia Silva

Approved By: _____


Thomas Bruneau, Principal Advisor


Thomas Bogenschield, Associate Advisor


Thomas Bruneau, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs


David Whipple, Chairman
Department of Systems Management

ABSTRACT

This thesis investigates the relationship between Mexico and the United States, specifically in terms of the impact of ongoing trends in drug smuggling and illegal immigration. The work begins with a review of the historical development process in each country, a discussion of the meaning of the border relationship, and the placement of drug trafficking and immigration issues within their current contexts. Following this introduction to the issues, drug trafficking and immigration are each explored in depth. The research effort concludes that economic motivations are at the root of problems stemming from the issues of drug trafficking and immigration, and that the traditional paradigms of the Mexico-US relationship, as well as a profusion of political finger-pointing, prohibit it from evolving into the partnership necessary for the continued development and prosperity of the two countries. Recommendations include acknowledging the historical and cultural differences at work in the countries, an admonition against US internal involvement in Mexico, and several more specific recommendations for dealing with the problems of drugs and immigration that were identified during the research.

Accession For	
NTIS	CRA&I <input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
DTIC	TAB <input checked="checked" type="checkbox"/>
Unannounced	<input type="checkbox"/>
Justification	
By	
Distribution/	
Availability Codes	
Dist	Avail and/or Special
A-1	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. INTRODUCTION	1
II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES.	5
A. INTRODUCTION	5
B. COMPARATIVE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES	6
1. Conquest	6
2. Colony	7
3. Independence	8
4. Consolidation Process	9
5. American Expansionism	9
C. THE MEANING OF THE BORDER.	10
1. Political Issues	11
a. Global Leadership/Developing Country	11
b. Government Systems	13

2. Economic Issues	14
3. Social-Cultural Issues	16
a. Cultural Patterns	16
b. Traumas	17
4. Military	19
a. Perspectives of Threats	19
b. Defense Issues	20
D. PROBLEMS WITHIN THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP	21
1. Drug Trafficking	22
2. Immigration	24
3. Other Issues	25
a. Salinity of the Colorado River	25
b. Disposal of Contaminant Materials	25
c. Racism	26
III. DRUG TRAFFICKING: THE PROBLEM	28
A. INTRODUCTION	28
B. DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY	29

C. IDENTIFICATION OF THE THREAT	30
D. DRUG PATTERNS: THE PROBLEM IN BOTH COUNTRIES	31
1. The US: Demand and Consumption	32
a. Consumption	33
(1) Social Status: Drug Use	35
(2) Age: Drug Use	35
(3) Behavior of the Drug Addict	36
b. The Drug Connection	38
c. Organization of the Distribution Net	39
d. Sales	40
e. Money Laundering	42
f. Production	43
g. Arms Trafficking	45
2. Mexico: A Supply and Transshipment Country	47
a. Production of Raw Materials	48
b. Laboratory Processing and Packaging	51
c. Transportation and Smuggling	51

(1) Cost of Drugs	52
(2) The Personnel	52
(3) Corruption	52
(4) Transportation	53
d. Consumption	56
e. Money Laundering	57
f. Problems Controlling the Border	58
E. LEGISLATION: ONE OF THE TOOLS	58
1. US Legislation	60
2. Mexican Legislation	61
3. Legalization of Drugs	61
IV. DRUG TRAFFICKING: A THREAT TO THE US-MEXICO RELATIONSHIP	63
A. INTRODUCTION	63
B. THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING	64
C. US EFFORTS AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING	70
1. Unilateralism	72
2. Joint Operations	75

D. CYCLICAL POLICY	77
E. FRICTIONS WITHIN THE RELATIONSHIP	78
1. Reactions to Unfair Verbal Attacks	79
2. The Case of Enrique Camarena	82
3. Violations of Mexico's Sovereignty	84
a. The kidnapping of Alvarez Machain	84
b. The Tianguis Automobilistico Issue	85
c. Electoral Monitoring	86
4. Mexico as Scapegoat: The Immigration Problem	86
5. Political Interference	89
6. The NAFTA Debates	92
a. NAFTA's Statements	92
b. Albert Gore-Ross Perot	93
7. Policy Inconsistencies	95
8. A Profitable Business	96
F. THE GOOD NEWS IN US-MEXICO RELATIONS	97
V. NAFTA: THE NEW ENVIRONMENT	100

A. INTRODUCTION	100
B. NAFTA: ITS HISTORY AND TEACHING	101
C. IMPACT OF NAFTA	103
1. The Immigration Problem	106
2. The Drug Trafficking Problem	108
D. THE NEW EVENTS	110
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	113
BIBLIOGRAPHY	122
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	131

I. INTRODUCTION

To analyze the relationship between Mexico and the United States is to examine the encounter of two cultures transplanted from the European Continent to North America, with their differences and rivalries. The historical sequence of encounters, interaction and consequences has determined the dynamic of their relationship. As a result of the changing global situation, despite the asymmetry of power between these two nations, their national interests tend to converge because they share a 2,000 mile land border. For Mexico this fatal proximity prompted the phrase: "Alas. Poor Mexico, so far from God and so close to the United States."¹

In the contemporary period many negative economic, social and political trends are affecting both countries. These threats are growing and may continue to deteriorate the bilateral relationship with additional negative effects in other important areas. Essentially, these are the existence of a huge demand for drugs in the United States, and the low income of many peasants in several areas of Mexico. "The growth of the drug trafficking as industry comes from the big gap that exists between the price and cost, a gap that also keeps some relation with repression."² An additional factor is a rapid population growth and the incapacity of the Mexican government to provide enough jobs.

The first problem is asserted by the Republican Benjamin A. Gilman:

¹ General Don Porfirio Diaz Mori, former President of Mexico, on boarding the "Ipiranga" in Veracruz on June 15, 1911 that transported him to his deportation to France.

² Arrieta, Carlos, G, *Narcotrafico en Colombia*. p. 21.

"In short, our joint 2,000 mile border is out of control; it is a virtual sieve, and our two nations are reeling under a constant onslaught of narcodollars that are corrupting the political, the economic, and social institutions of both of our nations."³

To the second issue, Henry Kissinger and Cyrus Vance argued:

"Mexico may well present the most challenging problem for the United States in the western hemisphere. Most Americans appreciate the importance of Mexico to the United States. However, it is very difficult to know how to deal with the complex relationship . . . It would be unrealistic to assume that there is simple, global solution for all of the issues in such a complex problem. We believe, however, that Mexican-American relations deserve high priority."⁴

The end of the Cold War is a framework of good opportunities to improve the binational relationship. There are some barriers that should be overcome before these two different cultures can work together in a joint effort to face and improve their future. The recent signature of the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement) is a good step towards improving the relationship in the North-American sub-continent. Although it is an economic agreement in origin, it also carries some environmental and social regulations in the so-called "parallel agreements." Thus, the impact of this economic accord will be felt in the social, political and military fields.

The problems within the Mexico-United States relationship involve myriad complex variables. The interrelationships among these problems are interconnected in a complex net that is difficult to untangle. So, in order to narrow the scope of this study, I will focus on drugs such as marijuana, heroin, and cocaine, because of their importance in

³ Benjamin A. Gilman (R) from New York. Committee of Foreign Affairs. The camarena Investigation. July 17, 1986. p. 312

⁴ John H. Coatsworth and Carlos Rico. Images of Mexico in the United States. p.4

the illegal drug trade between Mexico and the United States. It also focuses on other related problems, such as immigration, corruption and violence, because of their deep implications in the relationship.

For the expert in Latin American affairs, Chapter Two may appear as a detour to the focus on the drug-trafficking problem. But it is in precisely this moment where the reader has the opportunity to penetrate the Latin American mind, because the average citizen of the United States does not know much about the countries to the south of the Rio Bravo (Rio Grande). The United States pays considerable attention to European and Asian affairs, but general knowledge of Latin American is rare. Chapter II ends with an identification of the main sources of problems within the binational Mexico-United States relationship.

Chapter III analyzes the menacing shadow that underlines the clouds of uncertainty in the present context. The destabilization of underground drug trafficking creates threats. The menace of drugs ruins the people's will in the consumption markets, and provokes violence and chaos that tend to destabilize the security of the producer's countries. This chapter also analyzes the links between demand and supply. Because the drug market has an inelastic demand, the source of the supply side is not important. Drugs can be supplied from any source country in the world, from Asia, Middle East, South America, Mexico. They even be produced domestically. Ten times more drugs are produced than are consumed. In this form is created a conflict of common interest in the affected countries, in our special case the United States and Mexico.

Chapter IV is the core of this study. Here the reader can appreciate how the weaker country is expertly used as a scapegoat for hidden purposes. The media, politicians, middle rank officers and even those people with enough money use the Mexican people and their systems, magnifying their mistakes while concealing their virtues. In their destructive criticizing, they look for the thorn in their neighbor's eye while trying to forget the post in their own eye. They exalt and move the masses as a means to achieve their selfish interests. This jeopardizes the relationship and diminishes opportunities to achieve cooperation, and thus the development of a better life.

Chapter V describes NAFTA and its implications. It highlights free trade in the hemisphere as the cornerstone of a new era of inter-American cooperation. I emphasize the need for Mexico's economic development while the United States continues as a hegemonic power. NAFTA creates a new environment to structure joint policies to achieve progress, thus reducing the drug trafficking and immigration problems that affect the relationship between Mexico and the United States.

In this study, I attempt to analyze the relationships of Mexico and the United States in the NAFTA environment, despite the aggravations represented by the dynamics of drugs and immigration. Both are menacing shades lifted before the relationship of industrialized and developing countries against the advantages that NAFTA could facilitate in reducing these problems.

II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MEXICO AND THE UNITED STATES.

"I know him only so far as I know him; and all of that depends as fully on who I am as on who he is". James Agee

A. INTRODUCTION

What difference can provoke a distorted image of a neighbor? How can his history, beliefs, problems and needs, aspirations and dreams affect us? It is possible to answer each one of these questions; but is it feasible to do so without at least a basic knowledge of his origin?

To analyze the relationship of Mexico and of the United States, it is convenient to first consider the factors that produced the behavior of their societies, and then summarize their historical relationship to analyze the present. We are thus able to glimpse their future.

The relationship between Mexico and the United States is full of misunderstandings and escalated difficulties up to the level of armed conflict. Conflicts have been generated by the different development processes of both countries; the intended lack of understanding between both cultures; and sharp direct contact between two so distinct nations.

The encounter was given artificially, by the transplant of population of two european regions with different cultural heritage to an adjacent space in what was called

the New World. The brusque encounter traumatized both countries, heirs of those european cultures. In words of Bruce Babbitt, "Mexico and the United States are united by geography and divided by history."⁵

B. COMPARATIVE HISTORIC DEVELOPMENT PROCESSES

The conquest, colonization, independence and the consolidation processes of Mexico and the United States are not parallel developments at all. These events took place in different situations and times, and were affected by differing geographic environments, chronologies, the potentiality of the indigenous and european cultures in their encounter; and their development processes.

1. Conquest

In Mexico, Spain began a bloody conquest of a vast territory, imposed a religion⁶ and mixed with the indigenous population. Spain fought to destroy the powerful and bloodthirsty Aztecs, the Tarascan warriors, and the educated Mayans. Spanish conquerors burned and destroyed their shrines and buildings in an attempt to change their religious traditions to obtain their subordination. And because they were victorious the soldiers coupled with the native females.

⁵ Susan Kaufman Purcell. Mexico in Transition. Implications for US Policy. Essays from Both Sides of the Border. April 1988. pp.vi-vii

⁶ Diego de Velazquez (Governor of Cuba), instructed Cortes before he left to the Mexican Conquest in 1519: "Bear in mind from the beginning that the first aim of your expedition is to serve God and spread the Christian Faith". Peter Winn. Americas: The Changing Face of Latin America and the Caribbean. p.61. Besides, in this sense they created a manifest destiny, that is: "If God wants, it is just his will". Mexico's popular saying.

In the United States England began the colonizing⁷ process in an adverse area because of the inclement winter; its first accession survived thanks to the support provided by the scattered indigenous population in the area. "The religion in the New English Colonies is established with cults freedom for the Christians religions except Catholics and Unitarians".⁸ Its settling process was accomplished in a reduced area that was gradually enlarged throughout the Atlantic coast to maintain trade with England. This initiated a continuous and open multinational immigration process -- mainly British and North European -- parallel to an integrating trend among the colonies.

So, while in Mexico the conquest is a brutal imposition process; in the United States it is an expansion process of the European civilization.

2. Colony

During the settlement process New Spain permitted only Spanish immigrants who retained political, economical, social and military power. This policy provoked a conflict with the descendants of the first expeditionary group. The system of government was centralized and imposed from Spain.

On the contrary, the British Colonies featured a multinational social mosaic. Important aspects of the colony included: the equality of rights of the inhabitants within the British Empire; the freedom of private investment; and the minimal governmental

⁷ History of English colonization began with Humphrey Gilbert, confidant of the queen in 1578. He secured the royal patent to possess and hold: "heathen and barbarous landes countries and territories not actually possessed of any Christian prince or people". Significantly, the patent guaranteed to Englishmen and their descendants in such a colony the rights and privileges of Englishmen: "in such like ample manner and form as if they were borne and personally resident within our said Realm of England". George B. Tindall. *America: A Narrative History*. p. 35.

⁸ Toleration Act of 1689. G. B. Tindall. *America: A Narrative History*. p.44

control from the British metropolis, thus began an integration process which drew the Colonies into a Federation, prompted a draft of a Constitution,⁹ and established a unique democratic system for the colony.¹⁰

The two nations thus developed different governmental systems. While Mexico grew in a centralized system, the United States developed in a democratic and federal process that was completely decentralized from the metropolis.

3. Independence

The independence process in the English colonies was caused by problems of economic and fiscal character¹¹ by the end of the 18th Century. The independence process of the New Spain, in contrast stemmed from dissent among Creoles supported by the Mestizos -- the bulks of the people -- who together sought political separation from Spain at the beginning of the 19th century.

Thus, while in the former British colonies the independence process was an economic and political issue¹² that culminated in 1776, in New Spain the independence process was a political and social one¹³ that culminated in 1825.

⁹ In 1643, Massachusetts Bay, Plymouth, Connecticut, and New Haven; looked for their own safety, formed the New England Confederation and behaved like a sovereign power. - Another example was the Fundamental Constitution of Carolina, draw up by Lord Ashley-Cooper with the help of his secretary, John Locke. Ibid. George B. Tindall. America. A Narrative History. pp.66-69

¹⁰ Ibid. pp.55-64

¹¹ The Currency Act of 1764, The Stamp Act of 1765, The Revenue Act of 1767, among others, being the most important of all the Torch Act of 1773. George B. Tindall. America: A narrative History. p.183-98. Also see Richard Shenkman. "I Love Paul Revere, Whether I Have Rolled or Not. p. 155.

¹² "No taxation without representation". George B. Tindall. America: A Narrative History. p.189

¹³ Blockade Decree to the Fortress of San Juan de Ulua. Inicio y Consolidación de Nuestra Independencia. Revista Secretaria de Marina. Sep-Oct 92. p.27

4. Consolidation Process

As a consequence of different independence processes, both nations face their fate with different perspectives on life. Mexico continued to be bled in internal struggles; as a nation it did not find stability due to its lack of cohesion. Its economy declined through the time, based on the traditional Hacienda with its consequence: the cacicazgo.¹⁴ Externally, Mexico's foreign affairs were tinged with the covert aspirations from European powers that bloodied the country. So began a fluctuating process of external interventions and isolation.

The United States, with a national unity only bloodied by the Civil War, caused its economy to grow through its flourishing industry. Externally, it applied its hegemonic will in the Western Hemisphere through the Monroe Doctrine¹⁵, while maintaining a relatively respectful and good relation with the European powers.

5. American Expansionism

At the end of the XVIII century England and its colonies with its large population launched westward to conquer far more than the Appalachian Mts. and deprive France from its American territory, New France. The expansionism of the United States was continuous, following the Manifest Destiny.¹⁶ The United States fought and

¹⁴ Although distorted and sensationalist, Distant Neighbors of Alan Riding gives a great approach of the Mexicans behavior; including this polemic figure.

¹⁵ James Monroe, Annual message to Congress on December 2, 1823. Monroe's Doctrine adoption date 1852. Could be resumed as: "America for the Americans". George B. Tindall. AMERICA: A Narrative History. p. 388

¹⁶ The Manifest Destiny of the American Republic: to expand over the continent of North America by peaceful and by force of republican principles of government. Hans Weigert, Principles of Political Geography. p. 8

grew westward to reach the rich California coast of the Pacific Ocean. Expansion stopped only when it reached the existing Southeastern border of Mexico.




Figure 1. American Expansion, 1783-1898.

C. THE MEANING OF THE BORDER.

Since 1848, the Mexican-US border also marks the limit between two Americas -- the Latin and the Anglo-Saxon. But what makes this border so striking without a doubt is that it forms the separation between two contrasting worlds: the world of the industrialized countries and the world of the developing ones. The relationship between

Mexico and the United States developed, as Mario Ojeda argues, "in a framework of an increasing asymmetry in power and economic and technological disparity."¹⁷

Thus the fundamental geographic line between Mexico and the United States is also the partition line of political, cultural, economical, and militarily divergences.

1. Political Issues

Organizational study has shown that the power differential between both countries affects their diplomatic negotiations and foreign policy options; while their historic heritage affects its respective procedures.

a. Global Leadership/Developing Country

Traditionally, the United States has practiced its foreign policy toward Latin America with a certain scorn. It has viewed all the countries "South of the Border" as a "backyard"¹⁸ -- as some United States scholars refers to the Latin American countries -- that is, as second class powers where the United States has applied, in an hegemonic manner, a wide range of policies. These policies vary from the Manifest Destiny and Monroe Doctrine, among others, through the Good Neighbor Policy and the Alliance for Progress. The techniques used to applied these policies ranged from diplomacy to coercion, on which the United States places its national goals over and above the national interest of the Latin American countries.

¹⁷ Mario Ojeda. The Future of Mexico-US Relations. In US-Mexico Relations: Economic and Social Aspects.

¹⁸ President Clinton in referring to the Haiti issue, he mentions that Haiti is in the US backyard. Univision. May 20/94. By Armando Guzman.

After WWII, Mexico abandoned its former policy of isolation, and increased its activism as a world actor. In international forums it defied the will of the United States. Mexico's voice has taken force within the developing countries. It has acted more to balance power as one of the Third World Leaders,¹⁹ rather than joining the bandwagon as a weak state in the shadow of the United States. Frank Tannenbaum suggested that "Mexico had been the anvil of American foreign policy."²⁰

On behalf of these divergences, the United States has inconsistently applied unilateral actions more against than in favor of Mexico's national interest such as Operation Intercept in 1969²¹ and 1986, the imposition of 10% surcharge on imports in the summer of 1971,²² and the tourism boycott by US Jews in 1977,²³ creating a backing down in the international relationship and also a conflict of interest. As a result, both sides of the relationship are worse off because of the increasing interdependence caused by its geographic vicinity. Although the United States is simultaneously harmed by punishment Mexico has been harmed even more. That is why, with the "Mexican's humor" it has been said that "when the United States has the flu, Mexico has pneumonia."²⁴

¹⁹ These are some positions that marked the leadership of Mexico in the international arena: The Lopez Mateos' respectful policy toward the 1959 Cuban Revolution in the OAS; the rhetoric of SELA (Latin American Economic System), and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States of Echeverria; the Policy toward El Salvador during the Administration of Lopez Portillo and continued during the tenure of De La Madrid; and the condemnation of the US intervention in Panama by the Salinas Administration.

²⁰ Frank Tannenbaum. Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread. pp. 247

²¹ President Nixon applied what he called "shock treatment," consisting of a slow down in the transit of persons and goods at the border. This was in response to illicit drug trafficking.

²² This was in retaliation of the Mexican shift of voting pattern in the United Nations.

²³ During the Resolution in the General Assembly of the United Nation, equating Zionism with racism.

²⁴ See: More Border Operation Reactions. Mexico City XEQ Canal 9 television. 02:00 GMT

b. Government Systems

Both countries have similar governmental structural organizations as federal republics, and are representative democracies. The spirits of their respective Constitutions are also similar but, there are some differences because of their historic heritage. Thus, their government systems act differently and create certain conflicts within their relationship.

One of the major differences between the two countries' institutional systems is that the US System takes its economic and political foundation from a Protestant parliamentary tradition of decentralized, independent decision making: the Mexican System, in contrast, reflects the Spanish Monarchic authoritarianism and centralist heritage of the Spanish presence during the colonial period. It also reflects the fingerprint of the Catholic Church.

The existence of "lobby groups" is another reality in the United States. The democratic process facilitates such pressure. Its impact on national interest is difficult for the outside observer to understand, as a basis for determining national policies. In Mexico, political pressure is manifested directly through Unions and other political organizations, although most of them are integrated in one political party²⁵, the PRI (Revolutionary Institutional Party).

Oct 12, 93.- Also see Border State Governors Cited on Operation Blockade. Paris AFP 19:04 GMT
Oct 23, 93

²⁵ Most of the worker and peasants organized in unions and ejidos are grouped in one of these two organizations: the CTM (Mexican Workers Confederation) and CNOOC (Workers and peasants National Organization). Both are affiliated to the PRI.

2. Economic Issues

Existing economic differences in the border region are among the most dramatic contrasts between the contiguous nations. Along the border an observer can see poverty and opulence, unemployment and high salaries, resignation and faith. Two cultures live side by side, separated only by the strands of wire fences and ultimately by metallic walls. Economic divergence has grown even greater in recent years despite the progress that Mexico has recorded.




Figure 2. The Mexican-US Border.

There is no question that the contrast between the two economies threatens the interaction between Mexico and the US. The effects can be observed in the flow of capital southward and northward respectively, and in the movement of labor northward.

At night one can see on the Mexican side of the border, the lights of groups waiting for a chance to dash north across the border --toward San Antonio, Phoenix, Los Angeles and beyond -- people searching for better work opportunities.

The existence of a big gap between both economies adds to the global leadership position of the United States, and highlights this asymmetry of power. Octavio Paz, in reference to this asymmetry pointed out: "our relationship with the US is still the relationship of strong and weak, oscillating between indifference and abuse, deceit and cynicism".²⁶

Mexicans, because of the asymmetry of power, hold separate and different views about the "quality" of the United States attention and the "quantity" of United States power applied in the relationship. Even though Mexicans recognize the big economic gap, they do not accept that the United States is trying to impose its will in the relationship. On the contrary, Mexicans expect equal treatment from its northern neighboring country; and they claim with justifiable conviction that the treatment they receive from the United States is unfair.

In contrast, the United States has neglected Mexico in the relationship due to its international agenda as a global leader. It has also relegated Mexico's agenda to a second priority, except in some delicate border affairs such as drug trafficking and immigration. As a result, there is a conflict of perceptions, "Mexicans often ask the United States to pay close attention and to behave more responsibly toward Mexico. Likewise, US

²⁶ Octavio Paz. Mexico y los Estados Unidos: Posiciones y Contraposiciones. September 29, 1978.

criticisms of Mexican policies often boil down to appeals for more responsible behavior of the Mexicans." ²⁷

Alan Riding easily describes this phenomenon: "the Mexican ambassador in Washington is an unimportant diplomatic figure, with rare access to the White House; the US envoy to Mexico City dominates the local diplomatic scene and meets frequently with the President." ²⁸

3. Social-Cultural Issues

Mexico and the United States are coupled by their vicinity but divorced by cultural heritage. Our common border, once divided by empty spaces on far frontiers, is filling up as Mexico's population skyrockets towards a hundred million and that of the United States reaches almost a quarter of a billion. But because of these recent direct cultural encounters --within less than one and a half centuries-- the assimilation of cultures and thus the similarity has not yet been reached. That is why Riding pointed out, "probably nowhere in the world do two countries as different as Mexico and the United States live side by side." ²⁹

a. Cultural Patterns

Both countries must understand that divergence in customs takes root with regard to their mother countries inheritance. Differences in interests derive from the different historical experiences and levels of development. Both customs and interests

²⁷ Susan Kaufman Purcell, *Mexico in Transition. Implications for US Policy. Essays from Both Sides of the Border.* p.64

²⁸ Alan Riding, *Distant Neighbors. A portrait of the Mexicans.* p.470

²⁹ Alan Riding, *Distant Neighbors. A portrait of the Mexicans.* p.xi

tend to converge through the interrelation of the societies and equality in the level of development.

Media plays an important role in the first concept. American television programming exerts a strong influence in Mexico through its wide variety of programs. Mexican television, although less noticed before, has increased its presence in most American cities. Media affects the behavior of the population on the opposite side of the border. On the other hand, the increasing trend of interdependence between both societies tends to favor trade; consequently diminishes the economic gap. Thus the interests of both societies tend to converge.

b. Traumas

Historical relations between Mexico and the United states have been immensely painful, beginning with the quarrel of two societies over boundaries, colored by imperialism, religious and ethnic overtones, and the deprivation of half of Mexico's national territory through the forced independence of Texas and the unrighteous Mexican War of the United States³⁰ in the first half of the last century³¹. This was followed by the application of "Big Stick Diplomacy"³² and Wilson's policy of "Governments' Recognition"³³ in the beginning of this century.

³⁰ George B. Tindall. America. A Narrative History. p.544

³¹ Richard D. Erb and Stanley R. Ross. United States Relations with Mexico. Context and Content. p.3

³² "Speak softly, and carry a big stick". George B. Tindall. America. A Narrative History. p.926

³³ President Woodrow Wilson points out: "We hold, as I am sure all thoughtful leaders of republican governments everywhere hold, that just government rests upon the consent of the governed". Ibid p.978.

In the United States, Mexico has been mistakenly viewed as being internally feeble and confused; as having a foreign policy that creates problems for U.S interests in Central America; and as becoming potentially vulnerable to intervention by external actors. Such views are perilous in the sense that they may create a hegemonic nationalist wish. Pressure can be exerted on Mexico in a "now that they are down, let's get'em and make' em shape up",³⁴ kind of thinking.

Meanwhile, in Mexico the United States is increasingly misunderstood; as an unprincipled and ambivalent superpower in domestic disarray. The vision of the United States as a declining power in an increasingly fragmented and hazardous world³⁵ does not arouse much sympathy or dismay in Mexico.

In synthesis, the "contiguity with the United States has proven a permanent psychological trauma. Mexico cannot come to terms with having lost half of its territory to the United States, with Washington's frequent meddling in its political affairs, with the US hold on its economy, and with growing cultural penetration by the American way of life"³⁶ without appeal to nationalistic postures and thus, to a special term and interpretation of sovereignty. "Nationalism is an inward looking phenomenon that cannot prevent unneighborly acts by the United Sates but enable the country to survive the blows."³⁷

³⁴ Susan Kaufman. Mexico in Transition. Implications for US Policy. Essays from Both Sides of the Border. p.65

³⁵ General Colin L. Powell.- From Globalism to Regionalism: p.5

³⁶ Alan Riding. Distant Neighbors. A portrait of the Mexicans. p.458.

³⁷ Alan Riding. Distant Neighbors. A portrait of the Mexicans. p.460.

4. Military

Because of the asymmetry of power between Mexico and the United States, the perception of their foreign affairs and thus the identification of external threats were different. The United States looked in the recent past to a "Communism Containment Policy", while Mexico searched for development and economic issues that would allow it to become a more secure and stable system. These threats thus converge only on the non-military threats that affect social stability, economic growth, and therefore, the social welfare.³⁸

a. Perspectives of Threats

Due to the termination of the Cold War, the US military is now finding a new enemy. The enemy is inside, in the drug cartels, and, after initial resistance, it has entered that struggle with considerable enthusiasm. The DoD (Department of Defense) has established a JTF (Joint Task Force) under the command of the US Army but with a sizable Marine component near the United States-Mexican border. Undoubtedly this position gives them a much more visible and active role in the antinarcotics arena. But it simultaneously creates a feeling of threat to Mexico's national security, especially after the 1989 US intervention in Panama.³⁹

By contrast, Mexico has pursued its external national interests with the support of a solid set of norms derived from international law. Its foreign policy is not the result of conjuncture or convenience. Foreign policy is one of the grand national

³⁸ Richard H. Ulman. *New Thinking About Security. Redefining Security*. pp.129-153.

³⁹ Riordan Roett. *Mexico's External Relations in the 1990's*. p.239

traditions, supported by the continuous observance of the Estrada Doctrine ⁴⁰ principles and the support of international law in the world arena. Moreover, the history of Mexico demonstrates how the guiding principles of foreign policy emerge and develop through the traumatic experiences of threats to national sovereignty.

b. Defense Issues

In external defense affairs, the shared border of Mexico and the United States has provided Mexico with a safety umbrella in case of a global confrontation. Mexico, due to asymmetric difference of power, has always been an ally to the United States. ⁴¹Its geographic position has permitted it to divert defense resources to support the development of the country by investing less in armaments and more in education and welfare.⁴²

On the other hand, the United States has had to increase its defense budget by virtue of having a bigger area to cover for its national defense. Due to its hegemonic position and world leadership increases in the US defense budget are considered normal. In comparison with total defense expenditures these do not have great significance. In this form, the external defense of the region rests on the armed forces of the United States, and Mexico is not considered as an associate in these matters.

⁴⁰ Estrada Doctrine: Nonintervention, self-determination of the states, the use of reason over force, the importance of political negotiation and compliance with the norms of international law. Jorge Vargas. Manual de Derecho Internacional para Oficiales de la Armada de Mexico. Politica Internacional Mexicana.

⁴¹ See Stephen M. Walt. The Origins of ALLIANCES. Balancing and Bandwagoning. p.147-180.

⁴² Traditionally the Government Expenditure in Defense has been in an average of 0.54% the GNP (Gross National Product); That represents a military expenditure of \$ 9.36 dollars per capita. While in same period the U.S. has been an average of 5.8 the GNP; and \$ 994.09 dollars per capita. Data period 1977-1989.

D. PROBLEMS WITHIN THE CURRENT RELATIONSHIP

Both countries maintain interest in one another's economic development and in social-political issues because of their increasing interdependency. Currently, Mexico and the United States face a series of related domestic problems that should be solved through joint effort. Among the social dilemmas underlined by their degree of threat are drug addiction, drug trafficking, arms trafficking, violence, corruption, prostitution and the loss of moral values. To this is added the rapid growth of the population, illiteracy, and others. Economic problems include low skilled labor, low productivity, unemployment, racial discrimination, low wages and poverty. The interaction of all these problems are present in some measure within both societies and affect each country in the terms of their respective cultures. The political problems that arise due to the differences in government systems act from time to time as multiplier factors that demean the relationship. This has been a useful tool by politicians and lobby groups to achieve hidden interests.

As Secretary of State Warren Christopher stressed during the 48th UN General Assembly: "These are not easy relations. They never have been, and I doubt if they will be in the future, considering the two nations' difference in size, culture, and style. Nevertheless, the relations are positive, and we are working out our disputes with respect" he later added "relations between the two nations are about to move into a new era". Fernando Solana, Mexico's former Secretary of Foreign Relations, declared during the meeting "President Clinton has privately and publicly expressed his respect and interest

in bringing the two countries closer in all sorts of areas. There can be no better sign than this."⁴³

1. Drug Trafficking

One of the most important adverse issue that the United States-Mexican relationship faces is drug consumption and drug trafficking. These problems are intimately related to other dilemmas, such as arms trafficking, violence, corruption and prostitution. In the United States the eruption of drug consumption, the consequent increase in drug-related crimes in many American cities, and the attendant rise in media coverage of drug issues clearly stimulate public awareness and concern over the drug epidemic. ⁴⁴Although economic development or the lack of it is often overlooked as a core element of the drug production and trade, it is a significant factor in making the illegal drug trade tempting. Mexico combines different geographic, economic and social characteristics that place it in the supply side of this illicit trade, while United States is on the demand side.

So in this form, the combination of demand and supply of drugs in the neighborhood produces a series of accusations and claims that jeopardizes the relationship between the United States and Mexico. Meanwhile, the enormous profits derived from the illicit trade have fueled the growth of violent criminal organizations whose economic resources, political influence, and firepower give them the wherewithal

⁴³ Solana Meets Christopher, Sees "Positive" US Relations. Mexico City NOTIMEX 0035 GMT. 30 Sept 93.

⁴⁴ Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Vargas. The United States and Latin America in the 1990's: Beyond the Cold War. p.215.

to destabilizes, intimidate, or, in some cases, to manipulate various national governments in the region. ⁴⁵And if the relatively powerful US government has failed to destroy New York's famous "five families"⁴⁶ despite a decades-long campaign to do so, can the comparatively much weaker governments be expected to do better, i.e. Colombia or Mexico?

The Mexican debt crisis cannot be blamed as a cause of the drug trade in United States, although it is an important part of the problem. Difficult economic conditions enhance the seductiveness of the drug trade. As pointed by former president George Bush during the Commitment to Democracy and Economic Progress Conference; "drugs threaten citizens and civil society throughout our hemisphere. Joining forces in the war on drugs is crucial. There is nothing to be gained by trying to lay blame and make recriminations. Drug abuse is a problem of both supply and demand and attacking both is the only way we can face and defeat the drug menace"⁴⁷.

Meanwhile the drug war is fought in the United States, which jails more prisoners per capita than any other country: 455 per 100,000. About 20 percent of Federal prisoners are drug offenders with no prior record, no history of violence and no connection with any big drug operation;⁴⁸ and \$13.2 billion will be spent in FY 94 on the drug campaign. \$12.2 billion was spent in 1993.⁴⁹

⁴⁵ Jonathan Hartlyn, Lars Schoultz, and Augusto Vargas. *The United States and Latin America in the 1990's: Beyond the Cold War*. p.215.

⁴⁶ UNOMASUNO Dec. 7/93. By Rodolfo Medina. *No Contamos con Pruebas para Arrestar a los Jefes que Distribuyen la Droga en EU*. pag 12.

⁴⁷ Ibid. p.2.

⁴⁸ The New York Times. Feb 18/94. p. A15. *Abroad at Home. Political Crime*. By Anthony Lewis.

⁴⁹ The New York Times. Feb. 8/94. p.A13. *President Plans to Raise Drug Treatment Budget*.

2. Immigration

Other complex, acrimonious, and potentially intractable dilemmas trouble relations between the United States and Mexico, two adjacent and relatively friendly nations. These revolve around the question of migration. Nowhere else in the world is there a boundary between two nations of such remarkably different levels of wealth. The combination of the diverse economic policies in the past, the rapid population growth, and the proximity of economic disparities has created a northward movement of migrants that has become a major issue between the two nations.⁵⁰

Unemployment in Mexico is not the only reason for Mexican workers to emigrate to the United States. The difference in the level of development between the two nations and the apparent opportunities available to immigrant workers in the United States⁵¹ contribute to the perpetuation of this phenomenon.

For the United States undocumented workers are not just a burden; on the contrary, they represent a positive element in the economy. In fact, if it was not for illegal workers many marginal lands would never be cultivated, and much hard labor would never be accomplished. ⁵²Moreover, it has been proved that immigrant workers pay their taxes and do not make use of many government services; therefore, their net contribution to the economy is positive. ⁵³This dilemma also benefits unscrupulous

By Joseph B. Treaster.

⁵⁰ Richard D. Erb and Stanley R. Ross. United States Relations with Mexico. Context and Content. p.121.

⁵¹ Univision. KSMS Channel 67. May 5/94. 04:00 GMT. Tierra Prometida. Tierra Prohibida. By Maria Antonieta Collins. 04:00 GMT.

⁵² Susan Kaufman Purcell. Mexico in Transition. Implications for US Policy. Essays from Both Sides of the Border. p.112.

⁵³ Ibid. p.113. Also see TV Report Univision. May 24/94. by Armando Guzman. Report of

politicians who make the immigration a pro or con issue in their campaigns, with the only purpose of satisfying their ambitions and thirst for power.

3. Other Issues

a. Salinity of the Colorado River

In 1944 Mexico and the United States negotiated the International treaty on Limits and Waters. The water coming from the United States is completely contaminated, and this is because the dam system along the Colorado River is the most controlled system in the world. It contains 2,500 km of water controlled by 39 dams that at the lower end release into Mexico heavy loads of contaminants from agro-industrial residues. As a result of this contamination, in the period of 1979 - 1992, a total of 30,000 hectares have been affected reporting huge losses in wheat crops and also in human lives.⁵⁴

b. Disposal of Contaminant Materials

The 283 International Act refers to the treatment of the dirty waters of San Diego Ca. Contaminated waters go to Tijuana's beach in Mexico because the authorities of San Diego do not obey such regulations.⁵⁵

But these are not the only cases of contamination. Ciudad Juarez, Mexico and El Paso, Texas is another example of twin border cities that have contamination problems. 250 meters from the Rio Grande in El Paso is the smokestack of the ASARCO

the Urban Institute in Washington.

⁵⁴ FBIS-LAT, 94-043, 4 March 94, p. 12: Mexico City UNOMASUNO. 1 March 94. p.6. Legislators on Water Treaty With US By Jorge Octavio Ochoa.

⁵⁵ Excelsior. August 28/93. San Diego Arroja Aguas Negras a las Playas de Tijuana. By Rocio Galvan.

smelter, an enterprise which has been judged one of the worst polluters of the United States. Those who are most apparently affected by its lead and arsenic emissions are not El Paso residents, but the population which lives across the river because of the wind. The Mexican population who lives in the Juárez colonies are the ones who receives the contaminated air produced in the United States. There exist other issues of air pollution from automobiles, unpaved roads in Juárez and so on. And in 1992 Cd. Juarez was threatened with exposure to deadly cobalt contamination by an oversight in construction procedures.⁵⁶ As these few examples show thousands of problems must be fixed within the relationship.

c. Racism

Racism is a big factor in the migratory dilemma. The Mexican immigrant, who comes to the United States searching for work is generally an uneducated, low skilled person, with a low income. In addition to these characteristics the illegal status of the immigrant generates an exploitation schema and increases scorn towards the illegal aliens. This creates a distorted panorama in the perception of the United States people. This misperception is spread by the media and provokes within the different sectors of the country a false opinion of the binational relationship between Mexico and the United States.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Tom Barry, Harry Browne & Beth Sims. *The Challenge of US-Mexico Relations in the 1990's*. p.151.

⁵⁷ The Mexican War, was promoted by the print press. George B. Tindall. *America. A Narrative History*. p.544.

Racism is not confined to the immigration problem. The racism is present also in other places, such as the Smithsonian Institution in Washington D.C. There, Raul Izaguirre of La Raza's Special Commission; accused the Smithsonian Institution of racism. These charges were accepted by Robert Adams, Secretary of the Institution and strengthened by Miguel Bretos, historian of the Latin American Commission of this institute.⁵⁸

Thus relations between Mexico and the United States are affected by innumerable problematic issues that jeopardize the harmonic relationship. Among these issues, the main ones are drug trafficking and the immigration dilemma. Both of them were aggravated in the short run, but will diminished in the long run, by the implementation of NAFTA on January 1, 1994.

⁵⁸ Univision. May 10/94. By Lourdes Menuza. Racial discrimination in the Smithsonian Institution.

III. DRUG TRAFFICKING: THE PROBLEM

"The drug traffic is an international phenomenon that must be destroyed in all their phases and styles. By their characteristics of offer and demand, their drugs production, distribution and consumption claims an intensive, respectful and coordinated work among the specific authorities, to bring down the demand and avoid the production". Carlos Salinas de Gortari.

A. INTRODUCTION

During the Cold War, Mexico and the United States identified their threats from different perspective due to basic asymmetries in power. Both countries ranked threats according to: 1) their immediacy; 2) the circumstances that might allow threats to be realized; and 3) the damage that they could produce. As Stanley Hoffmann has written: "the key issue is to decide what is unacceptable, what bearable is, and what, in between, is dangerous or unpleasant but bearable under certain conditions."⁵⁹ These threats were addressed according to their perceived security implications and the availability of means. In that way both countries were careful to avoid other emerging threats that might produce serious consequences.

As a result of the dynamics of international relationships at the conclusion of the Cold War, Mexico and the United States faced a world tending towards regionalism. This new context presents an opportunity to redefine security threats and to implement new strategies leading toward political convergence rather than divergence, as in the past.

⁵⁹ John Norton Moore. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW. Pag 17. S. Hoffmann, Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War. 259.

To reassess these threats, it is first necessary to establish the meaning of national security. It is then possible to identify common domestic threats, especially those that might negatively affect the harmony of the United States-Mexico relations. It is also important to mention the environment in which the threat is developed, and finally, the legislation to restrict its use.

B. DEFINITION OF NATIONAL SECURITY

The classic conception of national security comes from foreign coercion or intimidation. As Lasswell mentions: "The distinctive meaning of national security is freedom from foreign dictation. National security policy implies a state of readiness to use force if necessary to maintain national independence."⁶⁰ This definition carries a misperception of threats coming from internal problems. This is mentioned by the 17th century philosopher, Thomas Hobbes: "it did not much matter whether threats to security come from within or outside one's own nation."⁶¹

Ullman expresses the widest and clearest definition of National Security:⁶² "a threat to national security is an action or sequence of events that 1) threaten drastically and over a relatively brief span of time to demote the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state, or 2) threatens significantly to narrow the range of policy choices available to the government of a state or deprives nongovernmental entities (persons, groups,

⁶⁰ John Norton Moore. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW. Frederick S. Tipson. National Security and the Role of Law. p. 3

⁶¹ Richard H. Ullman. International Security. Redefining Security. p.130.

⁶² Ibid, p.133.

corporations) within the state." Thus national security also implies the "protection...of vital economic and political interests, the loss of which could threaten fundamental values and the vitality of a state."⁶³

C. IDENTIFICATION OF THE THREAT

Among the internal dilemmas that the United States and Mexico face because of their geographic vicinity are drug-addiction and drug-production. Drug trafficking is an area of special concern for both governments because of the crime, violence, corruption, social disorder, individual destruction, and international tension that all this engenders.

The political debate and the media have been dominated by distorted interpretations of the drug problem. The implementation of intransigent unilateral policies and mutual recrimination have characterized the international relationship of United States-Mexico in these matters. Thus drug trafficking constitutes an interrelated threat to their relationship and consequently to their national security.

The declaration of drug trafficking in the US as a threat was formalized in 1986 by National Security Decision Directive 221:

"Drug abuse and trafficking threaten national security by degrading the nation's moral fiber and health, adversely affecting its economy, and undermining its foreign security interests."⁶⁴

⁶³ Donald J. Mabry. The Latin American Narcotics Trade and US National Security. pag. 3.

⁶⁴ Drug Control. How Drug-Consuming Nations Are Organized for the War on Drugs. GAO June 1990. p 17.

In a similar vein, in 1984 the President of Mexico, Miguel De la Madrid Hurtado, explicitly defined drug trafficking as the main threat to national security.⁶⁵ Additionally, the PND-89 (National Development Plan-89) ratified this statement when it refers to national security issues.⁶⁶

D. DRUG PATTERNS: THE PROBLEM IN BOTH COUNTRIES

Drug trafficking develops by following the marketing rules and the political principles of bipolarity. That is to say, the economic rules of supply and demand and the principles of political-economic North-South confrontation. The demand takes its roots in the consumer centers located in the "northern" or "developed" countries. On the contrary, the supply side is carried out in the poor drug producing and processing countries of the south, in the so-called "third world" or "underdeveloped world."

The consumer market usually appears in the industrialized countries with relatively high numbers of young people who have fought recent wars without reason; wars whose heroes are forgotten, discredited by the commercial media, and even rejected. Some points the participation of the US in the Vietnam war as a cause of a high percentage of drug consumers. In addition, the poisoning of the youth through the saturation of TV programs full of violence, sex, and false idols with no ideals has only one justification; profit. Thus, this youth, in a mixture of frustration, fear and rebellion with a lack of self-control look for drugs which make them forget their whining present and uncertain

⁶⁵ Foreign Affairs 66, No 1 (Fall 1984): pp 62-76. The New Challenge.

⁶⁶ Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Secretaria de la Presidencia de la República. 1989-1994. pp23-25.

future. The demand side of the drug trafficking threat accounts for the largest and most dynamic drug market in the world, the United States.⁶⁷

On the contrary, the centers of production appear in underdeveloped countries. There, the farmers because of their ignorance, lack of education, and dragged by their ancestral misery turn to clandestine activity; challenging the justice and receiving in exchange little more than a few coins more for their illegal crops. The supply side of the world of drugs comes from twelve producing countries⁶⁸; Mexico is among them.

1. The US: Demand and Consumption

Narcotics have infiltrated virtually every sector of US society. There is a market of approximately 25 million of regular consumers. They constitute the economic source which allows drug traffickers to finance the whole chain of illicit activities involving the supply of drugs to consumers.

In 1979, President Carter in his message on Drug Abuse said:

"No government can completely protect its citizens from harm --not by legislation or by regulation, or by medicine or by advice. Drugs cannot be forced out of existence; they will be with us for as long as people find in them the relief or satisfaction they desire..."

⁶⁷ The market of drugs in US during 1985-86 were: heroin and opium 6 to 7 metric tons; cocaine 105 to 107 metric tons; and marijuana between 7,500 and 11,650 metric tons. Guadalupe Gonzalez. The Drug Connection in US-Mexican Relations. p.11.

⁶⁸ Traditional drug producer countries: Afghanistan, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Ecuador, Iran, Laos, Lebanon, Mexico, Pakistan, Peru, Thailand, although there exist more producing and potential producing countries.. US Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. March 1989. pp 19-24.

a. Consumption

Drug abuse in the United States has evolved from an acute to a chronic problem. The drug use spectrum in 1976 was: nearly 10 million have abused cocaine, over 43 million have used marijuana and 450,000 use heroin daily.⁶⁹

Cocaine, marijuana and heroin represent serious social problems in consumer countries more than in other foreign supplier countries. The first two are considered a social problem because of the size of their user populations and the black market revenues they generate. The third is mentioned because of its unique criminal qualities⁷⁰ and its close relation with the HIV epidemic.⁷¹

Cocaine was perceived as a problem in the United States during the first half of this century. Particularly in the South, the press carried shocking reports of violent acts committed by "drug-crazed" users. By the Harrison Act⁷² and a series of following laws, cocaine was classified as a narcotic and users were subject to severe punishment. For a long time it was used sporadically but regained enormous popularity after the Vietnam War. Currently, cocaine and its fatal derivative "crack" pose the greatest drug threat to the United States.⁷³

Marijuana emerged after 1920 apparently because of the Eighteenth Amendment.⁷⁴ Contrary to opium, marijuana was not prohibited by the Harrison Act. A

⁶⁹ Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic Prevention 1979. The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1976. p. 6.

⁷⁰ Peter Reuter. *Eternal Hope: America's International Narcotics Efforts*. February 1985. p.1

⁷¹ See Charles F. Turner, Heather G. Miller. *AIDS: Sexual Behavior and Intravenous Drug Use*.

⁷² Harrison Act of 1914. Its stated purpose was to regulate the production and trade of opium. Guadalupe Gonzales. *The Drug Connection in the US Mexican Relations*. p.53.

⁷³ 1990: *International Narcotics Control*. The Department of State. P.3.

substantial portion of publicity against the marijuana began with the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, led by Henry Anslinger. This culminated in the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937.⁷⁵ Despite its prohibition, the use of marijuana continued in restricted circles and was eventually introduced to college campuses during the turmoil of the 60's. In the 70's numerous states, representing about one-third of the United states' population, "decriminalized" possession of small amounts of this drug.

The use of opium has been chronic in the United States since the second half of the last century. In 1875 the City of San Francisco banned opium smoking Chinese caves on behalf of the Harrison Act. After the United States embraced increasingly restraining policies restricting trade and illicit consumption, opium smoking imperceptibly decreased but was replaced by a continuous increase in heroin abuse imported from Europe.⁷⁶ Currently, the manufacture and sale of heroin continues to be banned under the Controlled Substances Act. Among the most perilous effects of drug use is the expansion of the HIV infection, primarily by intravenous drug users sharing contaminated needles.

The national Household Survey of 1990 projects 20.5 million users of marijuana in the United States in 1989; and 10.2 million in 1990.⁷⁷ In the case of cocaine the projection is 22.7 million users in 1989; and 6.2 million in 1990.⁷⁸ Heroin addicts

⁷⁴ The 18th Amendment, which sanctioned prohibition for manufacture, sale, or transport of intoxicating liquors. Ratified in January 16, 1919 and took effect in January 1920. George B. Tindall. *America. A Narrative History.* p.1031.

⁷⁵ J. Michael Polich, Phyllis L. Ellickson. *Strategies for Controlling Adolescent Drug Use.* Rand Corporation. p.14.

⁷⁶ Ibid. pag.56.

⁷⁷ Mark A.R. Kleiman. *Against Excess. Drug Policy for Results.* p.432.

⁷⁸ Ibid p.435.

were calculated at over 492,000 in 1981⁷⁹. Recently has been observe an increase in heroin introduction to the United States.⁸⁰

(1) Social Status: Drug Use. The increasing poverty trend of the American society, with its unhealthy effects such as unemployment, illiteracy, and deteriorating family values, are some of the factors that facilitate the increase of the drug problem. Symptomatic figures as follows are self-explicating and frightening:

- ♦ 24% of the 63 million of children in the US live with just one parent, compared with 12% in 1970.
- ♦ In Washington, 68.3% of births are illegitimate. The majority of them, 90%, are from African-American people.
- ♦ In Baltimore this proportion reaches 80% of births.
- ♦ The Census Office projects that 72% of children born in 1988 will live in disintegrated homes.⁸¹

(2) Age: Drug Use. Despite legal prohibitions and the interdiction campaign, the use of drugs is widely practiced and tends to grow. Based on the National Household Survey in 1988, the National Institute of Drug Abuse describe that 37% of the population over 12 years old had used illegal drugs and 12% were current users. ⁸²If this value is compared with the values of 1982, anyone can note the difference.

⁷⁹ J. Michael Polich, Phyllis L. Ellickson. Strategies for Controlling Adolescent Drug Use. Rand Corporation. p.10.

⁸⁰ Univision. May 14/94. By Armando Guzman. Peru and Bolivia Increase their Drug Production.

⁸¹ Leonidas Gomez O. Cartel. Historia de la Droga. p. 108.

⁸² GAO/NSIAD-88-156 DOD's Role in Drug Interdiction. p.14.

TABLE I. DRUG USE PATTERNS BY AGE GROUP, 1982.					
% OF AGE GROUP USING DRUGS				ESTIMATED TOTAL(millions)	
Drug	12-17	18-25	26-Over	1981	1988
Marijuana	11.5	27.4	6.6	31.5	20.5
Cocaine	1.6	6.8	1.2	11.5	22.7
Herione	0.5/less	0.5/less	0.5/less	1.0/less	1.0/less
Cigarettes	14.7	39.5	34.6	69.6	NA
Alcohol	26.9	67.9	56.7	124.7	NA

(3) Behavior of the Drug Addict. Family unity is disrupting, productive people are leaving their jobs, others no longer lead productive lives, and while health maintenance burden because of an increased percentage of drug consumption other people are dying.

In 1988, the officials and police of New York attributed 1,842 murder attacks per each 100,000 inhabitants due to drug consumption⁸³. The statistics of 1989 shows that 1,271 attacks happened in the same proportion next year. The cities of Detroit and Washington ranked below this with an average of 1,055 attacks. New Orleans, Boston, Dallas and Los Angeles followed close behind.

One of the causes that may drive this violence in the streets is the necessity of cash that the drug addict has to buy the drug. For example, marijuana cost \$10 per gram (roughly \$300 per ounce), the typical cigarette of 0.4 gram would cost \$4. If two persons divide the cigarette and thus their costs; it means that they will remain intoxicated for at least two hours, and they would be paying \$1 person-hour for the

⁸³ Leonidas Gomez O. Cartel Historia de la Droga. p. 202 See also: El Tiempo. Bogotá Colombia. January 11, 1990.

experience.⁸⁴ In the case of a crack addict, his burden to maintain his addiction is nearly \$50 daily, that is \$18,250 a year.⁸⁵ For the cocaine users, this burden is increased because the ounce of cocaine is worth about \$682 in the street market⁸⁶

In addition to the violent acts there are about 350,000 arrests for marijuana possession conducted every year.⁸⁷ The following table gives an idea of the arrest percentage per city.⁸⁸

TABLE II. PERCENTAGE OF DRUG RELATED ARRESTS		
Males Arrested	1988	1990
New York	74%	58%
Washington	70%	46%
St. Louis	38%	48%
Houston	49%	62%

A recent report of the New York Times said: "The United States has more prisoners per capita than any other country: 455 per 100,000. About 20 percent of Federal prisoners are drug offenders with no prior record, no violence and no connection with any big drug operation."⁸⁹

Besides the increase in criminality, there is the enormous economic burden because of health problems. More than half of New York City's heroin addicts are infected with the fatal AIDS virus. Every year 375,000 newborns are jeopardized by health-menacing drugs.⁹⁰ Add to the statistics above, the total number of fatalities were:⁹¹

⁸⁴ Mark A.R. Kleiman. Against Excess. Drug Policy for Results. p.433.

⁸⁵ Carlos G. Arrieta. Narcotrafico en Colombia. p. 129.

⁸⁶ The New York Times. Feb 17/94.

⁸⁷ Mark A.R. Kleiman. Against Excess. Drug Policy for Results. p.267.

⁸⁸ Mark A.R. Kleiman. Against Excess. Drug Policy for Results. p.436.

⁸⁹ New York Times. Feb 18/94. P A15. Anthony Lewis. Abroad at Home. Political Crime.

⁹⁰ Headline Series. No 290. Fall 1989. Merrill Collett. The Cocaine Connection. Drug

114,600 in 1970; 105,700 in 1980; and 93,500 in 1988. This gives an idea of the magnitude of the drug consumption problem as related to behavior.

b. The Drug Connection

Since the 19th century Mexico has exported marijuana to the United States. Although some regulation of restrictions exist, such as the Harrison Act and the Marijuana Tax Act of 1937, the supply and consumption continued unabated in the 1930s, and until the 1940s, early 1960s without a important problem within the relationship. That was, perhaps, why the use of marijuana was continuously associated with minorities. In the early 60's, the widespread increase in consumption among the youth of United States drastically altered public and official perceptions of drug abuse, specially the Mexican marijuana.

The Mexican supply of heroin since the 1920s was 10-15% of the market share in the US and was maintained at the same level until 1972 except during the WWII when the supply increased because of the war. From 1972-75 the supply of heroin from Mexico manifested increasing trend to 80 % in 1975. Later in 1976 it decreased to 67% and continued with the same trend until a 25% share of the market. The variation of the Mexican heroin supply was not accompanied by a similar trend in the United States consumption. A new source of supply replaced the Mexican supply: Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan, etc., as it happened before in the case of the supply from Turkish, Italy and France.

Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. p.46.

⁹¹ Mark A.R. Kleiman. Against Excess. Drug Policy for Results. p.437.

Drug connections always work. The drug source is not as important as to keep the supply for the demand. Almost 12-15% of the world drug production is seized.⁹² In such way, the isolated effort from a drug producer country to eradicate its illegal crops is overwhelmed by the massive production of another drug producer country. And because "where a demand for a service or commodity exists, some entrepreneur for the right price will attempt to supply it"⁹³

c. Organization of the Distribution Net

When a drug shipment has been smuggled into the United States it is conveyed overland throughout the country, first to the distribution centers, and then to the consumption markets.

While drug nets are flexible in their integration, some patterns remain constant: 1) drug dealers face few barriers to entry into the higher levels of the market. Most of the dealers start as low-level dealers, and they simply stay with it until they find a good new source. Usually their attraction to this business is driven by their own use.⁹⁴ 2) a successful operation does not require the creation of a large or enduring formation. The nets of cocaine dealers are typically of two or three people. Marijuana dealers, confronting the problem of rapid loading and unloading of contraband, have organizations that were slightly larger, usually three to eight persons.⁹⁵ 3) it is possible to function as a high-level dealer without recourse to violence. An individual who inspires

⁹² Leonidas Gómez O. Cartel. Historia de la Droga. p.38.

⁹³ President's Commission on Organized Crime, America's Habit. p. 237.

⁹⁴ Peter Reuter, John Haaga. A Rand Note. N-2830-NIJ. The Organization of High-Level Drug markets: An Exploratory Study. Feb. 1989. p.35.

⁹⁵ Ibid. p.6.

trust and is affable, moderately intelligent, well organized, ambitious, and willing to take risks can prosper.⁹⁶ 4) the wholesale drug market is national rather than regional.⁹⁷ A surprising 66.6% of drug dealers are reported to be legitimately employed at the time of their arrest.

Adolescents are an important sector within the organization because when they are arrested they receive light sentences. So, the boss of the gangs use young people to allocate the drug, and sometimes they are also integrated in gangs.⁹⁸

The goal of drug abuse prevention will best be served by exploring ways to reduce consumption in the street markets and deter young men from selling drugs.⁹⁹ It is a hard task to accomplish because a dealer is making profits between \$200 to \$400 per day.¹⁰⁰ Additionally, it also carries a great political risk because of threats to the democratic value of freedom.

d. Sales

Differences in the price of the drug when it arrives in the United States and when it is acquired by the consumer gives an idea of the traffickers' great profits.¹⁰¹ The

⁹⁶ Ibid. p.36.

⁹⁷ A Bibliography of Selected RAND Publications. 1992. p.12 P.H. Reuter The Organization of High Level Drug Markets: An Exploratory Study. Also see Peter Reuter, John Haaga. A Rand Note. N-2830-NIJ. The Organization of High-Level Drug markets: An Exploratory Study. Feb. 1989. p.40-51.

⁹⁸ Carlos G. Arrieta. Narcotrafico en Colombia. p. 129.

⁹⁹ P.H. Reuter. Money from Crime: A study of Economics of Drug Dealing in Washington D.C. A Bibliography of Selected RAND Publications. 1992. p. 10.

¹⁰⁰ A drug addict and drug dealer interviewed said: "When I was selling smoke I was making \$200 to \$400 a day." New York Times. Feb 2/94. Michael T. Kaufman. An Addict Who Took Road Back.

¹⁰¹ In 1988 the price of 1 kg of cocaine with 70% purity cost in the US \$170,000, while it cost when it arrived with a purity of 80% US \$20,000. Estimates are from DEA. Carlos G. Arrieta. Narcotrafico en Colombia. p. 51. Also see Policy Focus, No 2, 1989.

4

also published in the New York Times when referring to the arrest of Mayor Dennis Buckley. "...Mr. Buckley's regular visit took a decidedly irregular turn when he was arrested and charged with buying cocaine at the bar across the street from his office at City Hall."¹⁰³ In the past drug dealers established "crack houses" in Los Angeles Ca. When Arrieta describes these houses, he said they: "are in reality a fortress, in which there exist girls of 14 to 15 years of age, that pay for their addiction acting as prostitutes; those who arrive there find double satisfaction..."¹⁰⁴ Examples like this without explanation or answer could be interminable.

e. Money Laundering

The cartels and distribution nets have acquired huge economic resources from the drug trade. Furthermore, it seems that this capital has become an important economic force in areas like Miami¹⁰⁵, New York and California.¹⁰⁶

Money laundering, is the process of legitimizing illicit capital by concealing its source and ownership. This easy process has moved illegal currency offshore, out of the control of the United States; using nonbank financial systems from the "casas de cambio" along the US/Mexican border to the exchange houses in South America to the Hundi or hawalla system that connects Europe to Asia and the Middle East¹⁰⁷. Then cash deposit is in some kind of waxwork front corporation or directly into an offshore account

¹⁰³ Feb 2/94 p A8. By John Nordheimer Asbury Park Mayor Held on Drug-Buying Charge.

¹⁰⁴ Carlos G. Arrieta. Narcotrafico en Colombia P.128.

¹⁰⁵ "Money laundering is such a thriving business in Miami that investigators say it sustains large numbers of lawyers, bankers, accountants and brokers." Headline Series. No 290. Fall 1989. Merrill: Collett. The Cocaine Connection. Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. p.50.

¹⁰⁶ The San Francisco Herald. Sat/April/94.

¹⁰⁷ 1990: International Narcotics Control. The Department of State. p.8.

straight back into the United States by wire transfer. In such a simple way, billions of dollars have been laundered.

Some appraisers suggest that a large percentage of drug money, between 80 and 90%, never leaves the United States. The largest part of laundering operations are therefore made within the US banking system or in investments in the United States economy. As Senator Kerry asserted:

"We found that not just millions, but literally billions of dollars are being laundered through the American banking system and through other banks to our banking system..."¹⁰⁸

The laundering operations that take place outside the United States (10-20%) are set up in Caribbean offshore banking centers such as the Cayman Islands and Panama, or in nations with banking secrecy laws like Hong Kong and Switzerland.¹⁰⁹

Money laundering is prohibited in the United States, and continuing financial analysis of traffickers are usual. Money laundering is attacked through a variety of laws, such as the Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act, the Bank Secrecy Act, and federal income tax laws, among others.¹¹⁰

f. Production

Cocaine and marijuana are largely produced in the tropical lands of South America. Mexico also produces marijuana and heroin. In the United States marijuana is

¹⁰⁸ Sen Kerry.- International money laundering: Law Enforcement and Foreign Policy. US Senate. September 27, 1989 p. 1.

¹⁰⁹ Guadalupe Gonzalez. The Drug Connection. The US Mexican Relations. p.60.

¹¹⁰ Drug Control. How Drug-Consuming Nations Are Organized for the War on Drugs. GAO June 1990. p. 27.

the second most important cash crop,¹¹¹ although the State Department has placed singular consideration on reversing this affirmation, adducing that the data are inflated by the marijuana legalization lobby.¹¹²

Effectively, marijuana is cultivated in the United States where some of the same positive geographic and economic conditions prevail. In the states of Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Missouri, Kansas, Wisconsin, Minnesota, Nebraska, California and Kentucky there are illegal crops hidden by corn yields or in barnyards transformed into greenhouses. In National Parks such as the Shasta-Trinity National Forest in California, Daniel Boone in Kentucky or the National Forest in Oregon some parts have been closed to the public because of traps and other aggressive devices that drug growers put there to protect their harvests.¹¹³

In addition, the publications "High Times" and "Without Seed Tips" indicates where to find or buy better marijuana seeds, where to rent plowing fields, how to care for the marijuana harvests and so on. The publications are legal, have approval to be printed and pay taxes. Another example was recently published in the New York Times: "Joel Project was wrong to violate the law" the journalist said, and he adds..."but can it conceivable benefit our society to keep him in prison for five years for growing marijuana plants? And there are many thousands like him."¹¹⁴ is demonstrates the thin line between

¹¹¹ Scott B. McDonald. Mountain High, White Avalanche. Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama. p.2. Also see Riordan Roett. Mexico and the United States. Managing the Relationship. p.211.

¹¹² Head line Series. No 290. Fall 1989. Merrill Collett. The Cocaine Connection. Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. pp.42-46.

¹¹³ Leonidas Gómez O. Cartel. Historia de la Droga. p.64.

¹¹⁴ New York Times. Feb 18/94. P A15. Anthony Lewis. Abroad at Home. Political Crime.

legality and illegality in the United States within its democratic system and its interest in solving this problem. Profits drive the system.¹¹⁵

In 1988 the United States produced 4,600 tons, while Mexico produced 4,700 tons. ¹¹⁶Besides, the US producers have produced more powerful marijuana through the production of the "without seed" variety. The THC (tetrahydro-cannabinols) in the marijuana 'made in USA' reaches the proportion of 20%, while the Mexican marijuana and the Santa Martha golden of Colombia, reach from 0.5% to 7% of THC.¹¹⁷

Thus, the Mexican marijuana share in the market was reduced in the same proportion as the increase in United States production. This benefitted drug addicts because they enjoyed more the use of the powerful "without seed" marijuana (made in USA); which has more prolonged effects. As a consequence of the share lost in the US marijuana market, Mexican traffickers shifted to heroin production, where they can be more competitive and make more profits. This shift in production complicates the situation in drug interdiction because heroin is easy to hide.

g. Arms Trafficking

The relation "guns for drugs", is more frequently applied in the drugs trade jargon. Weapons purchased in states with permissive gun laws¹¹⁸ can be resold for a 300%-400% profit in nations with rigid gun laws. ¹¹⁹Advanced weaponry gives drug

¹¹⁵ Leonidas Gómez O. Cartel. Historia de la Droga. p.65.

¹¹⁶ Carlos G. Arrieta. Narcotráfico en Colombia. p.48. Also see NNICC (National Intelligence Consumers Committee Report 1988) April 1989.

¹¹⁷ Leonidas Gómez O. Cartel. Historia de la Droga. p.63.

¹¹⁸ "The greatest single reason why the United States has not adopted the more stringent types of firearms restrictions that are common in many countries is the existence of anti-gun control groups led by the National Rifle association (NRA). Edward F. Leddy. Magnum Force Lobby. University Press of America. p.1.

gangs the upper hand in attack maneuvers designed to terminate other gangs or defend themselves from government attacks in its efforts against drug trafficking. As the struggle increases, the necessity for huge quantities of weapons also increases. Violence impels the demand for weapons, and the bigger number of weapons upgrade further violence, thus continuing the vicious cycle that characterizes the relationship of guns for drugs.

TABLE III PREFERRED WEAPONS OF THE DRUG TRAFFICKER. ¹	
(AK Series)	TEC-9
Uzi	MINI-14
Galil	HK 91 & 93
Baretta AR-70	M-16
MAC-10	G-3
MAC-11	STEYR-AUG
AR/CAR 15	SKS
FN-FALL	STRYKER-12 (12 Ga./12 shot)

¹ Congress, House Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control.

Weapons traffickers smuggle arms like their drug colleagues but in a contrary direction,¹²⁰ that is, from north to south. Because of the border, Mexico is also the main target of this illegal traffic. "Most of the weapons had been smuggled into Mexico from the United States and were about to be shipped to Colombia for use by the Medellin cartel against the Colombian government and rival cartels."¹²¹

¹¹⁹ Mexico has restrictive laws in referring to arms control. Art 29.xiv and .xvi of The Organic Law of Public Administration.

¹²⁰ In paragraph 3.c. Transportation and Smuggling. There will be the different methods of smuggling drugs. Similar procedures use arms traffickers.

¹²¹ The Washington Post. February 26/88. p.A25. By William Birnigan. "Mexico Cracks Armas, Drug Trafficking Ring.




Figure 4. Recipient Nations of US-Sourced Firearms.

2. Mexico: A Supply and Transshipment Country

Mexico's geography, socioeconomic, and environmental conditions provide excellent conditions for the production of drugs. They have led Mexico to be a constant source of marijuana and heroin to the United States. The most important aspect of drug related problems Mexico faces is not the illicit processing and trade of crops, but rather the violence that it could engender. On the other hand, as domestic consumption does not reach the quantities consumed in other countries, it constitutes a problem to the security.

The drug trafficking problem in Mexico represents a threat to its national security. It can negatively affect many aspects of the bilateral relation with the United

States by contaminating the negotiating climate for important security, commercial, financial, or migration issues. The presence of drug trafficking tends to relegate other problems to a secondary position on the bilateral agenda.

a. Production of Raw Materials

Historically, the cultivation and processing of drugs in Mexico was a fraction of that seen today. There is no known cultivation of coca in Mexico. Mexico is only a transit country for South American cocaine to the United States. Crops of marijuana in Mexico have been in evidence at least since the last century. In the first half of this century, marijuana was viewed more as a useful substance for rheumatism and other medical applications than a drug, but the Mexican government forbid marijuana cultivation in 1923, and in 1927 banned its export.

Opium cultivation and production in Mexico was in evidence in the early 1920's in the mountains of the states of Chihuahua, Durango, Sinaloa and Sonora. The federal government banned its production almost immediately, in 1925, and embraced several legal sanctions against both sellers and users. Moreover, in 1929 the preparation of a revised penal code included severe penalties against drug growers, producers, and traffickers.

Marijuana and opium poppy cultivation is primarily carried out by poor peasants, although some advanced agricultural techniques had been found in the northern states. These peasants receive only a minimal share in the profits of this trade. They have been tempted to till marijuana or the opium poppy as a result of Mexico's traditional

difficulties in commercializing agricultural products and its low 'guarantee prices'. This was aggravated by the economic crisis and the continuous currency devaluation which followed.



Figure 5. Mexico.

In 1975 Mexico substantially increased its efforts to eradicate drug crops and implemented a permanent campaign against drug production and trafficking. As a consequence of this campaign, the supply of drugs to the United States decreased from

75% in 1976 to a 4% of the entire supply in 1981. These low levels were maintained in 1982 (6%), 1983 (9%), 1984 (20%), 1985 (32%).




Figure 6. The Mexican Percentage of Drugs Supplied to the US: 1976-1985.

The late Mexican increase in the United States marijuana market share was because of the increasing efforts in Colombia to reduce its production of cannabis.¹²² The report of the Commission on Organized Crime, instituted by President Reagan pronounced:

¹²² Guadalupe Gonzalez The Drug Connection in the US Mexican Relation. Miguel Ruiz-Cabañas. Mexico's Changing Illicit Drug Supply Role. p.48-51.

"This short history of marijuana trafficking demonstrates that law enforcement in a particular cultivation area is compensated by production and trafficking increases elsewhere"¹²³

This ratified the widening gap between foreign production and the supply of drugs to the United States because of its internal demand and consumption.

b. Laboratory Processing and Packaging

Mexico's family gangs process opium paste to get heroin. The coarse heroin achieved in these small organizations are of low quality and acceptance. this heroin was distinctive because of its color and lower quality, known as "brown sugar" or "tecata", and the "black tar". What is alarming is that Mexico had no domestic opium or heroin market; production was aimed solely for export to the United States. ¹²⁴These low quality drugs are later re-processed by the US distribution nets to appear as asiatic heroin. Thus profits reported to the Mexican growers and processors are very low compared with these made by distribution and reprocessing nets in the United States. Not only are there differences in profits, there are the differences in risk; because of the high risk of crossing the border represents for the Mexican gangs.

c. Transportation and Smuggling

The high risk of transportation makes drug prices different in South America, Mexico, and the United States. Smuggling and transportation represents a lot of profits to those who control the process. Most of the traffickers (80%) are from Colombia.

¹²⁵Mexico, because of the thousands of miles of porous border and a well-organized

¹²³ See President's Commission on Organized Crime. *America's Habit*. p. 154.

¹²⁴ Peter Reuter. *Eternal Hope: America's International Narcotics Efforts*. February 1985. p.18.

smuggling infrastructure, is a major target for trafficking gangs smuggling drugs into the United States market. Smuggling entails four primary costs: drugs, personnel, corruption, and transportation.

(1) Cost of Drugs. The lower replacement costs of drugs makes smugglers find it sensible to send larger shipments in a single load. The conveyance costs are the same for a 400-pound delivery in a solitary plane as for a 200-pound shipment. The aviator's risk of long-term imprisonment is also the same. The holds for deliveries by sea or by land. So the traffickers prefer to send large amounts of drugs in their shipments.

(2) The Personnel. The people in charge of the transportation process vary from the relatively unskilled "mules" who drive back and forth across the US-Mexican border, taking contraband in both directions; drivers of trucks and trailers; and the aviators and sailors who perhaps are the more skilled smugglers. For all of these persons the risk of being caught smuggling represents the same sanction if they are caught with 20 pounds or more of drugs.

(3) Corruption. Drugs as a major commodity in the drug trade have become a form of power. The huge profits obtained from the illicit trade fueled the growth of Mafia organizations whose economic resources, political influence, and firepower gives them the wherewithal to corrupt or intimidate official personnel within the governments. Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano in relation to this matter has announced that "Drug trafficking is not simply the process of transporting cocaine from South to North

America; it has political goals and participates openly and permeates the media, political parties, and state institutions to create problems."¹²⁶

(4) Transportation. The main routes that South American traffickers use for transporting drugs to the United States are as follows: a) through the Caribbean, where favored tactics include airdrops to high-speed boats that take drugs ashore on the Florida coasts, and b) air routes into Mexico and then across the United States-Mexico land border in different conveyances. If interdiction operations in Florida and the Caribbean are strong, then the traffickers shift to Mexico's routes. In the remote case that Mexico's government in an incredible effort breaks the drug transit, drug traffickers will shift to use other systems or routes to reach the market. A 1991 report of the National Drug Control Strategy relates that Mexico is the primary transit point for cocaine entering into the United States.¹²⁷

- ♦ Air. Private aircraft are used primarily to smuggle the cocaine from South America to Mexico. Traffickers have been able to make landing and refueling arrangements in many locations in Mexico. They fly through the Mexican sierra avoiding air traffic control radar until they reach one of more than 100 clandestine runways close to the Mexican border¹²⁸. The final stage is to take off from such runways in the Sierra de Chihuahua. They may be at risk for only a short period of time, then make the excursion over the border and drop the drugs in less than one

¹²⁶ FBIS-LAT, 93-101, 27 May 93, p. 11: Mexico City NOTIMEX 0542 GMT 26 MAY 93. Serrano Blames Crisis on Drug Traffickers.

¹²⁷ Drug Control. Impact of DoD's Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow. GAO. Sept 1991. p.10.

¹²⁸ El Norte de Cd. Juarez. p1. By Manuel Cabrera. Descubren 100 Pistas de narcos en Juarez-Ojinaga.

hour. ¹²⁹Interdiction of such smugglers is difficult when there is no continuous radar coverage along the Mexican border and while no aircraft in the air is available to intercept them. ¹³⁰Another drug trafficking procedure is to fly into Mexico where drugs are moved across the land border in containers, trucks, cars, and other types of conveyances.




Figure 7. Primary Cocaine Smuggling Routes.

- ♦ Sea. Two tactics employed by traffickers have so far proven relatively immune to the deterrent threat of interdiction. One tactic is the shipment of drugs in containers¹³¹ or in the numerous hiding places aboard large vessels. ¹³²The second

¹²⁹ Agua Prieta Son. A small Cessna 182 Centurion II with red stripes and registration XB-FFW airplane whose occupants presumably had dropped 18 packages of cocaine with a total weight of 462 kg in Tucson was intercepted at the local airport after being pursued by DEA agents in three planes. The two crew members: Paulino Cazarez Cardenas (26) and Carlos Rios Bernal (22) were both natives from Guasave. Hermosillo EL IMPARCIAL. 31 Jul 93 p.6A. By Javier Corella. Plane Intercepted After Cocaine Drop.

¹³⁰ Peter Reuter. A Rand Note N-2818-USDP. Can the Borders Be Sealed?. August 1988. p.5.

one, is the use of mother ships carrying hundred of tons and off loading to smaller and faster boats for the final run to the Florida and Texans coast.¹³³

- ♦ Land. The 2,000 mile United States-Mexico border is crossed daily by thousands of private and commercial vehicles and pedestrians. The smuggling of drugs is a function of the porousness of the US-Mexican border and of the density of the cross-border traffic with which the drug is moved. Some traffickers smuggling by land break down shipments to quantities of 50 pounds or less in an attempt to avoid detection.
- ♦ Vehicles. Cars and trucks are still the most frequently used vehicles for smuggling drugs into the United States from Mexico. There is frequently the use of fuel trucks, where the drug is smuggled in a small compartment in the tank, and is hidden by the smell of gas, oil or other liquid products. Another method is to hide the drug in strongly aromatic food.¹³⁴
- ♦ Mules. Drugs also enter the United States in relatively small bundles, in the so-called "trafico hormiga". The security in the crossing border by these pedestrian

¹³¹ The Customs Service mentions that 7 million cargo containers enclosing illicit drugs enter the United States every year. Headline Series. No 290. Fall 1989. Merrill Collett. The Cocaine Connection. Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. p.62.

¹³² Venezuelan drug traffickers recently embedded bags containing about 35,000 pounds of cocaine in concrete fence posts. They were shipped to United States. GAO June 5 1992. National Security International Affairs Division.

¹³³ Peter Reuter. A Rand Note N-2818-USDP. Can the Borders Be Sealed?. August 1988.p.4.

¹³⁴ Approximately 100 kg of cocaine base (98%), camouflaged as a shipment of double cream cheese, was seized by PGR agents in a counternarcotics operation in the town of Tapachula. Mexico City EXCELSIOR 5 August 93 pp 3A1, 3A4. By Rafael Medina. Cocaine Base Disguised as Cream Cheese Seized.

smugglers is a function of the density of traffic, although they also use the secret paths of the immigrants.¹³⁵

- ♦ Tunnels. In Agua Prieta, Sonora, one tunnel was found under the United States-Mexico border. Presumably it was intended to be used by drug dealers to move drugs to the United States.¹³⁶

d. Consumption

Drug abuse was once a problem for poor campesinos (peasants) and gente raspa (low class people) who smoke marijuana. Currently, drug consumption threatens the middle class, the elite, and the youth. A quarter of a century ago virtually no cocaine was smuggled through the country, but today tons are seized each year. The more that drug surpluses exist in the source countries, the bigger is the risk that the Mexican population begins to consume drugs.¹³⁷

During 1991, a drug consumption public poll in Mexico showed that 2.52% had smoked marijuana at least one time, 0.28% cocaine, and 0.09% heroin. To prevent increased consumption, the Mexican Government initiated a National Drug Abuse Prevention Campaign. The National Advertising Agency is helping with this effort by mounting a national media campaign featuring testimonials by popular actors and musicians.

¹³⁵ Peter Reuter, John Haaga. A Rand Note. N-2830-NIJ. The Organization of High-Level Drug markets: An Exploratory Study. Feb. 1989. p.8.

¹³⁶ Mexico City EXCELSIOR STATES Section 30 Jul 93 pp1,4.

By Francisco Santacruz Meza. Narcotunnel Found on Sonora Northern Border.

¹³⁷ FBIS-LAT, 93-091-A, 13 May 93, p. 11: Mexico City 11 April/93. EL FINANCIERO By Fernando Castillo. Clinton Administration Impasse on Drugs.

e. Money Laundering

Mexican drug traffickers, like their US counterparts, need to launder their money and to hide illegal profits. The PGR (General Attorney Office) and the SHCP (Finance and Public Credit Secretariat) are investigating money laundering by auditing firms mainly in the tourism, construction, air transport, saddlery, shoemaking, and amusement industries since February 93, in the States of: Aguascalientes, Baja California, Chiapas, Chihuahua, Guanajuato, Nayarit, Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tamaulipas and Veracruz. ¹³⁸In a memorandum to the Guanajuato State governor, Carlos Medina Placencia, Attorney General Jorge Carpizo noted that 29 municipalities comprising the State were involved in drug trafficking problems. ¹³⁹

The Mayor of Tepic Nayarit, Victor Perez Ruiz in a press conference declared the following: "the tourist development area of Nuevo Vallarta in the municipality of Bahia de Banderas has become a money laundering center, created by the drug traffic operating on Nayarit's southern coast and in some of the country's other states." He stressed that "one of the leading entrepreneurs is the notorious drug trafficker Joaquin "El Chapo" Guzman Loera, the lord and master of the entire municipality of Bahia de Banderas." The power of Chapo Guzman embraced the entire Vallejo sierra and lowlands, where he owned large amount of land planted with marijuana. The assets in money laundering are the Hotel Paraiso Radisson and Hotel Puerta del Sol. ¹⁴⁰

¹³⁸ El NORTE. Monterey 17 August 93. Money Laundering Investigations Under Way.

¹³⁹ Mexico City EXCELSIOR 29 Jul 93 pp 2-A1, 2-A-6. By Rafael Medina Cruz. PGR Investigating Money Laundering in Guanajuato.

¹⁴⁰ Mexico City, EXCELSIOR STATES Section. 26 Jul 93 pp 1, 4 y Correspondent Cesar A. Renteria. Nayarit Town Claimed Money Laundering Center.

f. Problems Controlling the Border

The Drug interdiction in the land border presents a double predicament. First, since part of the aerial shipments arrives in Mexican airspace and on soil, the collaboration of the Mexican government is fundamental if the drug is to be interdicted beyond the United States border. Second, constant searches for drugs (without obstructing commerce) inside vehicles and other conveyances that cross the border daily are amazingly exhausting with available search technology.¹⁴¹ These two dilemmas are exceedingly difficult to achieve without a better political understanding between the federal governments of both countries and their respective population. Long delays at the United States-Mexico border for commercial, business, and tourism traffic, such as the provoked by Operation Intercept, Alliance and Blockade, are considered to be expensive, intolerable, and offensive.

E. LEGISLATION: ONE OF THE TOOLS

Since the beginning of this century, governments have been concerned with the threat of drug abuse among their population. Different Conventions¹⁴² have been signed,

¹⁴¹ Every year, approximately 8 million containers cross the border and, as a result of this large volume, cargo inspection to detect all types of contraband is very cumbersome and time-consuming.

¹⁴² a) 1909 Shanghai Convention;. b) International Opium Convention in The Hague, 23 January 1912. c) The 1961 Sole Convention on Narcotics of the United Nations and its 1962 Protocol. Ratified by 113 nations. d) On June, 1987 Declaration of the U.N. International Conference on Drug Abuse and Illicit Trafficking in Vienna. Basically all encourages the signatory countries to examine the possibility of enacting laws to make illegal the full process of the drug traffick. But at the same time it set up a dual legal-governmental response to the phenomenon: a repression of supply and a tolerance for demand. See U.N. Publication Sales No S.77.XI.3, 1977; also U.N. Publication Sales No. E.78.XI.3, 1977. and also see Leonidas Gómez O. Cartel. Historia de la Droga. pp.228-254.

and world leaders have asked governments to increase their efforts in a world wide crusade against drugs. Requests about these matters have been frequently presented in international forums.

An initiative of the Peruvian delegation during the recent South American Convention approved the creation of an International Judicial Assistance Office. This organism will involve the United Nations and each country of the American hemisphere. The purpose of this office is to promote the exchange of information that may contribute to complete investigations about cases of drug trafficking.¹⁴³

Recent issues and articles from international organizations analyze, study and make recommendations about drug addiction and drug trafficking. They also manifest the need to intensify universal cooperation based on specific anti-drug efforts while balancing domestic policies agreeing with their own regulations.

In a recent interview with US-Mexico's Attorneys General, they ratified their decision to maintain cooperation in the struggle against drug trafficking by respecting the sovereignty of the two countries and human rights, as well as explicitly banning cross-border kidnapping.

Jorge Carpizo informed Janet Reno of the decision to create a unit that will guarantee and speed up the legal proceedings involving US citizens who are in Mexico and have committed crimes abroad. Reno stated that the US Justice Department is in the

¹⁴³ FBIS-LAT, 94-028, 25 FEB 94, p. 1: Lima, Peru. El Peruano. 14 Feb 94 p.81. International Office Created to Combat Drug Trafficking.

process of appointing a legal attache to the US Embassy in Mexico to promote legal cooperation¹⁴⁴

1. US Legislation

In its continued preoccupation with the internal problems that face the United States since the last century the US government has enacted several laws. In the 1920's the Harrison Act virtually prohibited drug use, and the Marijuana Tax Act in 1937 peaked the movement to restrict marijuana consumption.¹⁴⁵

The participation of some US Agencies in the drug war are restricted in certain ways by their own regulations. This is the case of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 U.S.C. 2291(c)) which impedes the DEA from taking an active part on arrest, or from being present when host countries make arrests. ¹⁴⁶Another example of this type of restrictive legislation is the Posse Comitatus Act (18 U.S.C. 1385) and legislation enacted in 1981, known as the Posse Comitatus Amendments (10 U.S.C. 371 to 378). The Department of Defense Regulations understands the act to preclude the military services from: 1) interdicting a vehicle, vessel or aircraft; 2) search and seizure; 3) arresting, stopping and frisking, or other similar activity; and 4) providing personnel for surveillance or pursuit of individuals, or as informants, undercover agents, investigators, or interrogators.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁴ FBIS-LAT, 93-196, 13 OCT 93, p. 14: Mexico City Canal 13. 1300 GMT 12 Oct 93. Newcastle: Buenos Días México.

¹⁴⁵ President's Commission on Organized Crime, America's Habit. pp 187-223. Short History of Marijuana Laws in US

¹⁴⁶ Drug Control. How Drug-Consuming Nations Are Organized for the War on Drugs. GAO June 1990. p 25.

¹⁴⁷ Drug interdiction. Operation Autumn Harvest: A National Guard-Customs Anti-Smuggling Effort. GAO June 1988. p.20.

On the other hand, some enactments have allowed other agencies like the DoD to enhance in a more active role under the S-2728-A Bill to amend Title 10 of the US Code that clarifies and expands the authority of the Armed Forces to provide support for civilian law enforcement agencies. ¹⁴⁸Other bills have allowed the Department of Defense to provide additional support to state and local agencies for anti drug-activities. Such is the case of the S-2910-an original bill that authorized appropriations in FY91 drug interdiction and counter drug activities of the Department of Defense.¹⁴⁹

2. Mexican Legislation

Mexican legislators would not fall behind their US colleagues, and they began to legislate antidrug laws since the consolidation of Mexico after the Mexican Revolution. Article 73 of the Mexican Constitution stipulates the "federal government to be the one responsible to enact laws on.... general health in the Republic."

In the early 1920's during the Alvaro Obregon administration opium imports were banned, and in 1931 the Penal Code classified drug offenses and the punishment for such crimes. Additionally, Mexico had forbidden exports of marijuana and heroin and signed an international agreement calling for drug control.

3. Legalization of Drugs

Prohibition has not achieved its goal of limiting and halting consumption. But it has had an altogether unintended consequence; it has corrupted institutions and individuals. ¹⁵⁰The inhibition of corruption is a long-term task, because it represents a

¹⁴⁸ Congress, Senate. 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 13 June 1990.

¹⁴⁹ Congress, senate, 101st Cong. 2nd Sess. 26 July 1990.

¹⁵⁰ Mexico City UNOMASUNO 12 Jun 93 p 1,7. By Jaime Sanchez Susarrey. Let's Debate

difficulty that deals not only with laws to be legislated but also with gradual changes in habits, values, and the interest of public officials of both countries.

On the other hand, paradoxically, those who are to blame for the most deaths are the so-called soft drugs or legal drugs such as cigarettes and alcohol. For each person who dies from the use of cocaine or heroin, 100 die of alcoholism, and 1,000 contract cancer or fatal cardiac ailments from tobacco. The greatest social harm and deaths caused by banned drugs do not stem from drug offenses but rather from the outrage accomplished as a result of their illegal sale.¹⁵¹ According to the Mexican economist Luis Pazos, "the first to benefit from the legalization would be the consumers themselves, many of whom die from adulterate drugs or extremely dangerous drugs like crack."¹⁵²

But, as appointed by President Carlos Salinas de Gortari "the government cannot struggle against drug trafficking without society's participation. This is Mexico's fight against an enemy of Mexico and the world."¹⁵³ It is a war which state governments must fight in a joint effort with their societies.

Legalization.

¹⁵¹ Mexico City EXCELSIOR 25 Jun 93 pp 7-A, 14-A By Luis Pazos Drugs; The Wrong Road?

¹⁵² Ibid.

¹⁵³ FBIS-LAT, 93-108, 8 JUN 93, p. 20. Mexico City XHTV television Network 0200 GMT 3 Jun, 93 Salinas Evaluates Campaign Against Drugs.

IV. DRUG TRAFFICKING: A THREAT TO THE US-MEXICO RELATIONSHIP

That one who decides a case, without listening to the statement of the other, although his decision be a fair one, cannot consider himself right. Seneca.

A. INTRODUCTION

The drug issue generates delicate questions throughout society. It threatens political perceptions in terms of sovereignty and political authority and the effectiveness of the police and security forces. The drug problem affects social perceptions in terms of the rule of law and the decay of moral values. It also damages the family as the pillar of society. Drugs can ruin the economy of nations by interfering with the work ethic and efficiency in production, as well as through the underground economy and transfer of currency it promotes. The drug problem is considered a threat to the military capacity of a country, because anti-drug campaigns divert forces dedicated to external defense. But overall, the drug issue affects international relationships among countries where illegal trade have taken root. Consequently, there is a great demand for a solution to drug trafficking problems. This requires the participation of whole societies as well as governments.

Richard Craig highlights the excessive emphasis on the unilateral US emphasis on supply and the tendency to create diplomatic incidents with regard to the drug problem. This has negatively affected bilateral cooperation not only in the fight against drugs but

across the entire spectrum of the binational agenda. ¹⁵⁴There are four major structural intricacies that impede the effectiveness of efforts to control supply:

1. Weak economies of producer countries make them unable to execute effectively their antidrug campaigns.
2. The number of source countries is large enough to guarantee that success in the eradication of illegal crops in Mexico may be immediately negated by the development of new crops in other nations. Besides, Mexico's geographic proximity encourages drug traffickers to use it as transshipment country.
3. Historically the binational US-Mexico agenda has been complex. Although the drug trafficking issue is of special importance, the complexity of the agenda makes difficult to put drug trafficking as a top diplomatic priority.
4. The basic policy of supply interdiction and eradication of illegal crops is doubtful in its results, expensive in the means used and unproven. Moreover, because of the apparently unsuccessful outputs; the emphasis on the supply side looks more like a deferred issue and a political decision than an effective commitment to solve the problem.

B. THE PERMANENT CAMPAIGN AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING

The Mexican struggle to eliminate drug crops and intercept drugs at the US market represents one of the most serious joint efforts within the executive branch of the

¹⁵⁴ See Richard Craig US Narcotics Policy toward Mexico: Consequences for the Bilateral Relationship. Guadalupe Gonzalez. The Drug Connection in US-Mexican Relations. pp 71-93 .

Mexican government. This crusade has been a police-military enterprise in Mexico over the last 48 years. It began in 1946 with a campaign to destroy poppy fields in Sinaloa. It continued as a yearly operation in accordance with the cycles of poppy and cannabis. Later, as drug growers moved to other areas within the Sierras Madre, Occidental y Oriental (Western and Eastern Mountains) the efforts were spread practically over a large part of the Mexican territory. It became a "Campaña Permanente Contra el Narcotrafico" (permanent campaign) in the 70's and it remains with the same intensity up to now.

Since Mexico adopted its "Campaña Antidroga", during the late 1940s; four facts still hold true until today:

1. As a requisite for success because of the hilliness of the Sierra; the use of aircraft, preferably helicopters ease effort in the task.
2. The use of herbicides makes the task easier.
3. In the fray of drug trafficking there is a great risk of increase violence; thus, it affects security and national stability. It is one of the most delicate issues within the Mexican Political System.
4. Every time there is a change in the struggle, there is an ingenious traffickers' reaction, to switch tactics, revitalize production, and change in response to pressure from Washington.

During the mid-1970s, the campaign against the outlaw armed movement of Genaro Vazquez and Lucio Cabañas finished in the state of Guerrero. Mexico implemented in Sinaloa an anti-drug operation named "Operación Condor", that was

expanded to Durango and Chihuahua. "Operación Condor" was the cornerstone of Mexico's current antidrug campaign. As a result of this increased effort new problems had to be overcome and new benefits were achieved by the armed forces:

- Mexico bought from the United States some aircraft especially helicopters to strengthen its air power to fight the drug traffickers.
- Officers and troops gained useful field experience in what often looked like antiguerrilla warfare.
- Mexico's Federal Judicial Police, the Mexican Armed Forces, and US narcotics officials joined efforts to fight the drug problem as never before.
- A continuous rotation of military personnel was committed to the "Operación Condor."
- The target was to destroy new plantations, not the peasant. This was done by spreading large amount of herbicides such as "paraquat"¹⁵⁵ in plantations of marijuana and opium poppy.

25,000 Army troops were permanently committed in operations against drugtrafficking. Personnel and Naval Units, and other additional Army Units and Air Force units operate in areas of Caribbean and Pacific coasts, close to the Belize and Guatemalan border respectively. There were other permanent operations in the same antidrug effort in the states of: Chiapas, Oaxaca, Guerrero, Michoacan, Jalisco, Tamaulipas and Veracruz inland and offshore.

¹⁵⁵

Paraquat use is prohibited in the United States.

General Juan Arévalo Gardoquí, former Mexico's Secretary of Defense in 1987, in reference to the Condor Operation and other related campaign against drug traffickers¹⁵⁶ stated:

"This ministry considers as truly worthwhile the fact that, with the destruction of all the drugs referred to, the potential intoxication of 711 million persons in one week was prevented... The price of these drugs on the black market can be calculated at \$151.195 billion (pesos)¹⁵⁷... 17,572 Mexican individuals and 101 foreigners have been detained as alleged drug dealers and placed at the disposition of the corresponding civil authorities."¹⁵⁸

In 1990 Mexico created the Mexican Northern Border Response Force (NBRF), a rapid response team which interdicts aircraft delivering cocaine to remote areas of Mexico. The US supports the NBRF by sharing tactical information on suspected trafficker aircraft and by leasing transport helicopters to the Mexican government to enhance the NBRF's effectiveness.¹⁵⁹

Official documents from the Mexican Armed Forces stated that during 1992 they have eradicated: 36,070 plant fields of marijuana in a surface of 3,627 hectares, and 26,554 plant fields of Poppy in 2,578 hectares. They have seized: 45,339 kg. of cocaine, 393,192 kg of marijuana and 369 kg of opium gum and heroine. 12 laboratories were

¹⁵⁶ Not included in this announcement were the activities of the Mexican Navy, neither the PGR (General Attorney Office Police). The Department of Defense integrate the Mexican Army and Mexican Air Force. The Mexican Navy is a separate branch of the armed forces since 1949, and it integrate the Department of the Navy.

¹⁵⁷ FY 87 was the peak year of inflation in Mexico reducing to 160% annually. Thus the following numbers are approximate. \$197.49 billion, when the Mexican external debt reached the frontier of the \$90 billions. Source. Banamex. Num 794. Enero 1992. Note: 1 billion in Mexico is equal to 1,000 billion in the United States. That is: Mexico = 1,000,000,000,000. United States = 1,000,000,000.

¹⁵⁸ Guadalupe Gonzalez. The Drug Connection in the US-Mexican Relations. p 115. Also see Gral. Arévalo Gardoquí, El Ejército Mexicano, pp 12-13.

¹⁵⁹ 1990: International Narcotics Control. The Department of State. p.13.

destroyed and 64,168 millions of pesos (\$20.7 millions) were seized plus \$15.2 millions in cash.

Last year the National Institute for the Fight Against Drug Traffic was created as a new effort in the continuous campaign against drugs. This Institute has the objective of centralizing planning and supervising, and evaluating the activities aimed to fight drugs in a nationwide scale. It is also responsible for the health preservation of the Mexican population in coordination with the component institutions and the guidelines established by the PGR.¹⁶⁰ In the decree the President mentioned "in the past six months Mexico has had more drug seizures than Canada and the US combined in the same period."¹⁶¹

Before the Great Commission of the Chamber of Deputies, the Great Commission of the Senate, the Supreme Court of Justice, and Senate and Chamber of Deputies Justice Commissions President Salinas evaluated the permanent campaign against drug traffickers during his tenure in the following terms:

"...has resulted in the death of 150 public servants. In 4 1/2 years we have destroyed: 60,000 hectares of drugs, confiscated 200 tons of pure cocaine, almost 2 tons of heroine and opium paste, and 2,000 tons of marijuana. More than 86,000 people involved in drug trafficking have been arrested, and several heads of drug trafficking bands have been captured. Weapons have been confiscated, funds from money laundering have been detected, and shipments transiting our territory to other markets have been intercepted."¹⁶²

¹⁶⁰ FBIS-LAT, 93-116, 18 JUN 93, p. 12: Mexico City Canal 13 1300 GMT 17 Jun 93. President Salinas Sign Decree on Drug Enforcement Institute.

¹⁶¹ FBIS-LAT, 93-129, 8 JUL 94, p. 8: Mexico City XHTV Television network.0200 GMT 6 Jul 93. President Salinas Swears In National Institute To Fight Drug's.

¹⁶² FBIS-LAT, 93-108, 8 JUN 93, p. 20: Mexico City XHTV television Network 0200 GMT 3 Jun,93. Salinas Evaluates Campaign Against Drugs.

During last year's drug harvest season, General Antonio Riviolo, Secretary of Defense, reported that the Mexican Armed Forces had started an extensive operation against drug trafficking activities, which concluded on 2 November¹⁶³. The forces involved in this operation included: 13,626 soldiers, 17 helicopters, 415 vehicles and other material. Add to 3,307 members of the Navy's Canador Plan (permanent), 1,919 soldiers of the Marte Task Force (permanent). He added that operations have seized more than 2 tons of cocaine (between 23 Sept and 3 Oct., 1993) in Campeche and in (Ocosingo) Chiapas.

The Government devoted more and more resources¹⁶⁴ to combat the drug crime. Last year the Permanent Campaign had 1/3rd of the Mexican defense budget, 1/4th of the military forces and 60 % of the PGR budget.

Thus the Mexican Government's official efforts and determination to fight the battle against drug trafficking and consumption throughout the country cannot be questioned. Despite its economic difficulties, Mexico continued to fight its "Permanent Campaign" for nineteen years. But the results are quite open; discreet opinions say that more than two-thirds of the drugs consumed in the United States come through Mexico such as cocaine, Santa Martha "gold" marijuana, Mexican marijuana, "black tar" and "brown sugar" heroin, and even heroin from the "Golden Triangle" (Burma, Thailand, and Laos), the conveyance of which some Mexicans drug dealers are now monopolizing.

¹⁶³ FBIS-LAT, 93-196, 13 OCT 93, p. 5: Mexico City NOTIMEX 2128 GMT 6 Oct 93. Armed Forces Begin 'Extensive' Counternarcotics Operations.

¹⁶⁴ Mexico City UNOMASUNO 18 Jun 93 pp 1, 7. By Arnaldo Cordova commentary: "A Mistaken Fight".

C. US EFFORTS AGAINST DRUG TRAFFICKING

The primary element of US policy against drugs is to reduce the supply of drugs entering the United States. These efforts are directed to:

- ♦ 1. Law enforcement efforts, consisting of strengthening national judicial and police capabilities to curb drug trafficking and production.
- ♦ 2. Interdiction and other enforcement support before drugs arrive in United States territory.
- ♦ 3. International cooperation through diplomacy and other means.
- ♦ 4. Foreign aid sanctions.
- ♦ 5. Crop eradication, where politically feasible.
- ♦ 6. Trade initiatives.

All these efforts when applied in the border interact with the consent of Mexican agencies charged to fight the drug trafficking.

The US effort against the demand side has been less attended to because of political reasons, as asserted by Jose Luis Reyna:

"Formally speaking, any drug campaign (or action) oriented to suppress or to control the consumption of narcotics goes against the nature of US democracy, of freedom of choice".¹⁶⁵

The following table will validate this statement. It shows the percentages of the antidrug budget distribution.

¹⁶⁵ Jose Luis Reyna. Narcotics as a Destabilizing Force for Source and Non Source Countries. p 131.

TABLE IV. US FEDERAL DRUG TRAFFIC CONTROL BUDGET ¹			
Year	Amount (millions)	% Demand	% Supply
1981	1.2	32	68
1982	1.3	27	73
1983	1.6	24	76
1984	1.9	21	79
1985	2.2	18	82
1986	2.2	18	82
1987	3.9	23	77
1992	11.7	30	70

¹ GAO, NSIAD-91-297, Drug Control.




Figure 8. Fiscal Year 1992 Budget Request for the War on Drugs.

1. Unilateralism

One of the untenable diplomatic efforts is the inclination towards unilateral decision-making within a bilateral, and collaborative framework. US officials worried by their world agenda are not directly involved in the day-by-day antidrug programs. So, when drug related problems arise in the United States, they shift to a (unilateral) mode. This may achieve gains in the short run, but it fatally affects Washington's anti drug efforts in the context of US-Mexico relations.

The United States associates its anti-drug efforts with its foreign policy purposes. Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, (22 U.S.C. 2291) relates specific US foreign economic, military, and other assistance to collaborate with anti-drug efforts. (The Certification act)¹⁶⁶

In September-October 1987, the National Guard of five states and the US Customs Service carried out the Autumn Harvest operation. A cooperative drug air-interdiction effort. Its mission was to detect and apprehend smugglers bringing drugs across the Arizona-Mexico border in aircraft. The Operation had a cost of approximately \$960,000. But the outcome of this effort was negligible.¹⁶⁷

The LEDET program is another effort that places US Coast Guard personnel aboard Navy ships to interdict suspected drug traffickers and conduct searches, seizures, and arrests ¹⁶⁸. In fiscal year 1987, the Navy provided 2,500 ship days. This resulted in

¹⁶⁶ Drug Control. How Drug-Consuming Nations Are Organized for the War on Drugs. GAO June 1990. p.18

¹⁶⁷ GAO June 1988 p.4. Drug interdiction. Operation Autumn Harvest: A National Guard-Customs Anti-Smuggling Effort.

¹⁶⁸ Avoiding in such a way the Posse Comitatus Amendments (10 U.S.C. 371 to 378). See III.D.1 US Legislation.

20 vessel seizures, 110 arrests, and over 225,000 pounds of marijuana and almost 550 pounds of cocaine seized. The cost of the LEDET was about \$40 million; which is about \$2 million per seizure.¹⁶⁹

In the same year of 1987, the Air Force allocated 591 AWACS flying hours to drug interdiction, which resulted in 6 seizures and 10 arrests. The cost to DoD with this assistance was 42.6 million. This amounted to a cost of 7.1 million per seizure.¹⁷⁰

TABLE V. DoD PARTICIPATION IN ANTI-SMUGGLING ACTIVITY. ¹			
	1986-1988	1989	1990
Flying Hours	4,594	18,436	48,025
Steaming Days	937	2,081	3,830

¹ Drug Control. How Drug-Consuming Nations Are Organized for the War on Drugs. GAO June 1990. p.25.

This brief appraisal of interdiction efforts during 1987 clearly suggests that a major increase in interdiction activities, even including the military, will not significantly reduce drug introduction to the United States. Testimony during the fiscal year 1988 Foreign Assistance Hearings stated that the least expensive way to keep drugs out of the United States is to eradicate the illicit crops.¹⁷¹

Although this last conclusion was reached eight years ago; there are some task forces and interdiction activities along the border in Fort Worth, Lubbock, Laredo, and San Antonio, Texas; Phoenix and Tucson, Arizona; and San Diego, California. These supplement the Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force (OCDETF) based in El

¹⁶⁹ GAO/NSIAD-88-156-DOD's Role in Drug Interdiction. p.28

¹⁷⁰ GAO/NSIAD-88-156-DOD's Role in Drug Interdiction. p.28

¹⁷¹ GAO/NSIAD-90-133 Drug Control. Pag 44.

Paso. This task force researches major trafficking gangs that smuggle drugs across the Mexican-US border.

The Naval Patrol Hydrofoils are probably the most effective ships involved in anti-drug maritime operations. The six Pegasus class hydrofoils belong to Patrol Combat missile Squadron # 2, operating out of Key West, Florida. They have been assigned to the Joint Task Force #4 (JTF4). Since they were employed in the antidrug operations, (1985-1989), they have accounted 30% of the Navy's overall drug seizures, despite operating with only six ships.¹⁷²

The land Based Aerostats radar program currently managed by the Department of the Air Force maintains an adequate rate of coverage in support of counter-drug monitoring and surveillance requirements. ¹⁷³The balloons were deployed in the Florida Keys, Grand Bahamas Islands, Dening, New Mexico, Fort Huachuca and Yuma Arizona, and along the United States border. This program was deleted for FY94 due to its low efficiency profile.¹⁷⁴

By the end of 1989 the Air Force's anti-narcotics missions were expanded. The North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) was called in to assist in stemming the flow of narcotics into the United States.¹⁷⁵

Drug interdiction efforts climaxed in the attempt to station the USS John F. Kennedy battle group off the coast of Colombia in January 1990. Although the battle

¹⁷² V. C. Thomas. Terrors on Patrol. Sea Power (May 1990).

¹⁷³ Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1994. Sept 22, 1993. p. 295.

¹⁷⁴ DoD's Budget FY94.

¹⁷⁵ Drug War. Air Force Times. 25 December 1989.

group was to support the interdictions efforts, it looked like a blockade or at least as an attempt to frighten Colombia. As stated later by former Colombian President Virgilio Barco: "Colombian territorial waters are being patrolled by us and controlled by us."¹⁷⁶

An analysis by the Office of Technology Assessment reported: "There is no clear correlation between interdiction expenditures or effort and the long-term supply of illegal drugs in the United States."¹⁷⁷

2. Joint Operations

As a rule, Washington has relied on a cooperative approach with Mexico during the peaks of its anti-drug campaigns. At such times meetings and mutual decision-making are the rule.

One of the recent antidrug joint efforts began with Operation Intercept I, in 1969 during the Nixon administration; it was created as a necessary interagency interdiction effort along the Mexican border. Its outcome were a few seizures, far less than envisioned, but it generated serious tensions in the US-Mexico's relationship. Later, it was changed to "Operation Cooperation", which included Mexican government participation in the interdiction efforts.¹⁷⁸ This operation was designed to install a plan for permanent collaboration in drug control.

In 1975 Operation Condor was implemented. Under this operation Mexico increased its interdiction efforts, particularly against the expanding cultivation triangle of

¹⁷⁶ A. Rosenthal. # Andean Leaders and Bush Pledge Drug Cooperation. New York Times, 16 february 1990. p A1.

¹⁷⁷ Drug Control. Impact of DoD's Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow. GAO Sept. 1991. p.28.

¹⁷⁸ See Richard Craig, "Operación Intercepción: una Política de Presión Internacional". Foro Internacional 86:22 Octubre-Diciembre 1981).pp 203-230.

opium poppies in the "critical triangle" of Sinaloa, Durango, and Chihuahua. The poppy eradication campaign began in 1976, with collaboration and support of the US government. Conflict from that first operation nonetheless meant that the bases for bilateral discussion of the drug trafficking issue remained undefined.¹⁷⁹

Through time, the joint effort of both countries has varied in according to the intensity of the relationship. In 1991, the DoD transferred to Mexico: 21 UH-1H Huey helicopters. Additionally in 1992 a donation of more helicopters and some spare parts worth of \$26 million was authorized to the DoD. The FBI and DEA offered courses in investigations techniques to the PGR. Also the Customs Service and Coast Guard offered courses to Treasury officials and Navy Officers.

Currently the DoD provides information needed to conduct operations against primary means of smuggling. The DoD's coverage has been as close as possible to source and transshipment countries with airborne early warning aircraft and radar-equipped ships. This detection equipment has helped detect suspects as they leave source countries. The suspects are then tracked until their course can be passed through the official channels to the branch responsible for interception and apprehension.

Although the United States provides the information, the Mexican government, due to its permanent campaign, continues to expend more economic resources in its aerial antidrug effort.¹⁸⁰

¹⁷⁹ Guadalupe Gonzales. The Drug Connection in US-Mexican Relations. p.2.
¹⁸⁰ Mexico City. Excelsior. March 4/88. p.A2

TABLE VI. BUDGET FOR THE AERIAL ANTI-DRUG CAMPAIGN.		
Year	Mexico (\$ millions)	US (\$ millions)
1984	15.9	8.3
1985	20.0	9.7
1986	17.4	11.6
1987	18.1	15.5

D. CYCLICAL POLICY

Mexico has received considerable pressure from the United States over drugs in 1939, 1948, 1961, 1975, and 1985¹⁸¹. The larger Mexico's share in the drug market, the greater Washington's pressure to compel Mexico in the anti-drug campaign. The greater the pressure, the more US-Mexico bilateral relations are harmed. On the other hand, when market share indicators are promising, so, too are the relations. This attitude has been constant despite changes in government officials.

Historically, the issue of the drug trade has been an important topic in the internal political debate in the United States. It is one of those issues that can be a deciding factor in the presidential, gubernatorial or congressional election campaigns, as Eileen Burgin mentions: "reelection constituencies may directly motivate involvement when they express or exhibit interest in an issue in agreement with member's substantive views."¹⁸² In the 1968 presidential campaign, when Richard Nixon was elected, and in the 1986

¹⁸¹ Gregory F. Trevorton. Antinarcotics Strategies and US Latin American relations. p.148.

¹⁸² Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay. Congress resurgence. Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill. p.75

congressional race Mexico was harshly criticized and became the object of political pressures.¹⁸³

The current re-election campaign of California's Governor Pete Wilson reflects the same characteristics, although in this case it is the dilemma of immigration. There is no doubt that such campaigns draw response from the constituencies to win the elections; but it is questionable whether they make any progress toward fixing the problem. In the recent legal case of Mayor Dennis Buckley, Prosecutor John Kaye said: "He was elected on a strong law-enforcement platform. . . [yet] he has been a cocaine user for five years, and has been buying it at this location since taking office."¹⁸⁴ The rhetoric employed in political campaigns can have harmful consequences in the policy arena, where the result of competitive politics is generates inconsistency.

Mexico has never promoted the use of drugs in US society, nor is it the center of the drug mafia. There is a consistent lack of mutual understanding at the heart of this complicated international relations issue.

E. FRICTIONS WITHIN THE RELATIONSHIP

The full history of this harmful rhetoric is as long as it is painful. History has demonstrated the ability of the media to generate demands from the population which result in government action. The media is, however, motivated by the desire for success

¹⁸³ See Chapter Two. 1.a. Global leadership/Developing country.

¹⁸⁴ The New York Times. Feb 2/94 p.A8. By John Nordheimer. Asbury Park Mayor Held on Drug-Buying Charge.

in competitive markets, and the resulting government actions may be inappropriate to the given situation.

US citizens are well informed about Mexico's violence and corruption. These problems are aggravated by illicit drug trafficking and exaggerated by the media. But US citizens rarely perceive how drugs have significantly corrupted their own country as an entity, and as well as in official organizations. US inhabitants from a range of social strata have been victimized by the lure of narcodollars. It is hard to accept that the model of democratic values, human rights and ecumenical truth have also fallen victim to drug related problems. US policy towards drug interdiction has failed to curb the flow of drug-related corruption and violence in the United States.

The concomitants of drug trafficking (corruption and violence) have attained unimaginable levels in recent years. It is certain that shameless evidence of corruption can be found in some of the countries to the south to the United States. Yet corruption although concealed, is also present in the United States, and, violence is similarly evident. As Mexicans can say erroneously, it is part of the US style of life.

1. Reactions to Unfair Verbal Attacks

Corruption has become part of Mexico's idiosyncrasy due to the cultural heritage of both the: Spanish colonists and Indian Natives.¹⁸⁵ Corruption certainly exists in Mexico. But it is unfair to scapegoat Mexico and exalt the US when the same problem

¹⁸⁵ Corruption in Mexico may have had its roots in the Colonial era when the centralized government from the metropolis was imposed. Lack of government control to enforce the law throughout the extensive territory of the New Spain, besides the Spanish's impossible and 'baturro' (obstinate) character, add to the Native 'ladino' (cunning) and conformist characteristics; made an explosive mix, which its output was the custom to 'avoid the law if possible'.

exists in both countries. The reader must recall U.S-Mexican relations in the past, and has to have Mexican empathy to feel and think like a Mexican:¹⁸⁶

An official document stressed:

"Despite persistent problem with corruption (which the Mexicans are currently addressing), the United States and Mexico have been able to accomplish a great deal in the past 2 years, and the United States expects that cooperation to expand."¹⁸⁷

When these type of statements are listened to by the people of both countries, opposite effects are produced. To the US population, it creates a distorted image that all Mexicans are corrupt, to the Mexican, it revives the flame of nationalism and historical anti-US sentiments. The memories of the two nations are too huge, and 150 years are too recent to forget.

Mexico has recognized narco-corruption as one of its problems.¹⁸⁸ But the government is not the booster of the illegal crops and the transshipment of drugs to the United States. Corruption tends to be established locally and sometimes it is related to middle rank officials. No one can say and support objectively the assertion that top officials are also related to corruption. Declarations have been made in the US that some Mexican governors were implicated in drug activities, but no sufficient evidence has been presented to confirm these charges.¹⁸⁹ Are relations that officials have with drug addicts

¹⁸⁶ See Chapter two. American Expansionism, and The meaning of the Border. Also see George B. Tindall. America. A Narrative History. Thinkings of John Quincy Adams and Abraham Lincoln. p.544.

¹⁸⁷ 1990: International Narcotics Control. The Department of State. p.13.

¹⁸⁸ Mexico City Canal 13 1300 GMT 8 Jun, 93. Report by Juan Manuel Pereira. Attorney General Comments on Drug Investigations.

¹⁸⁹ Jose Luis Reyna. Narcotics as a Destabilizing Force for Source Countries and Non-source Countries. p.128.

or traffickers enough to declare him or her as connected with the drug business? Examples of casual associations between US politicians and drug traffickers abound. Roger Lee worked very close to Janet Gray Hayes, Tom McEnery and Susan Hammer --The first two named are former mayors of San Jose-- Lee had a contract with the Clinton-Gore campaign. Recently, Lee was arrested for selling "crack" cocaine.¹⁹⁰ Are these officials involved in drug trafficking? No one can say yes; no one has proved that they have relations with the drug business. They just hired Lee to work with them. Their only mistake was that they hired him without really know who he was. A similar case can be made for the stories of drug involvement among the former Mexican governors.

General Paul F. Gorman, chief of the US Southern Command in Panama, told a Senate Committee the following: "Within ten years Mexico would be the United States' "No 1 security problem," adding that it had "The most corrupted government and society in Central America" and was already "a center for subversion."¹⁹¹ If these harmful words (the most corrupt government) had been said by a prejudiced illiterate person they could not have affected the Mexican image. But since they came from a high-ranking US Army officer that does not know that Mexico is not a part of Central America, these words have negatively affected not only the image of Mexico, but also the relationship between both countries as well as national security of Mexico.

Jack Anderson published a column "exposing" alleged corruption by De la Madrid on the day the President de la Madrid met President Reagan, in May 1984. In

¹⁹⁰ Roger Lee was a "political wizard and drug abuser at the same time". San Jose Mercury News. March 27/94. pp1A, 28A. By Brandon Bailey and Barry Witt. The Two Lives of Roger Lee.

¹⁹¹ Alan Riding. Distant Neighbors. A portrait of the Mexicans. p.474.

certain actions the De la Madrid administration could be criticized severely; but not up to the point to say "he was a corrupted". To Mexican officials and the population in general, the published article was seen as a barely disguised official reprisal for Mexico's independent policy towards Central America. The report provoked an outpouring of nationalistic indignation towards Washington.¹⁹² This case is symptomatic of the enigmatic position of the US press.

2. The Case of Enrique Camarena

In 1985, the tragic murder of US DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration) agent Enrique Camarena and the Mexican pilot Armando Zavala prompted a intricate controversy. The Camarena case had great domestic and foreign negative implications in relations between both countries. Camarena's assassination in Mexico and the inadequacy of the PGR to treat it with the exigency demanded by Washington made Reagan administration spokesmen react publicly with unveiled threats and menacing rhetoric that made headlines for a long time, at the national and international levels. Mexico's discredit was substantial.

In January 1990 NBC broadcasted the "Kiki Camarena Story". This chronicle launched a wave of attacks on the Mexican Government which accused it of being completely corrupt. Although President Salinas and former President Bush by this time had discussed increased coordination efforts between the two nations the aggressive tone of the program negatively affected the relation between both countries.

¹⁹² Alan Riding. *Distant Neighbors. A portrait of the Mexicans.* p.474.

In December 1993, Richard L. Cañas, Counter-terrorism and Antinarcotics Director of the National Security Board of the White House, in a press conference, referred to the heads of the US drug trafficking network said:

"We know them. We have the identification of them. The problem is that as in the times of Al Capone: we have not enough proof to arrest them".¹⁹³

The US government with all its economic resources openly manifested that they were unable to move against New York mafia heads; why couldn't they wait for the long investigative process of the Camarena case? Was the Camarena case a special murder of an enforcement agent in Mexico? Currently, in the permanente campaign, 64 PGR agents have been killed¹⁹⁴; so how many investigations can be supported by the PGR with its budget constraints?

General Discua Elvir, Commander General of the Honduran Armed Forces, in reference to the national budget of the Latin American countries said:

"I have the statistics for 1992 that show that drug trafficking in Latin America increased by an amount greater than the national budget in each country."¹⁹⁵

What could the Mexican government and the PGR have done eight years ago with the big budget constraint due to the worst economic crisis in Mexico? Although, there were also some cases of ineptitude and corrupt detectives.

¹⁹³ UNOMASUNO Dec. 7/93. By Rodolfo Medina. No Contamos con Pruebas para Arrestar a los Jefes que Distribuyen la Droga en EU. pag 12.

¹⁹⁴ Period from December 1st /88 to October 31/90. Sistema Estadístico Uniforme para el Control de Drogas. PGR.

¹⁹⁵ FBIS-LAT, 93-099, 25 MAY 93, p. 9: Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Voz de Honduras Network 1145 GMT 24 May, 93. Interview with General Leis Alonso Discua Elvir, Commander General of the Armed Forces, by Raul Balladares.

3. Violations of Mexico's Sovereignty

From verbal attacks to the actions. "Operation Just Cause" in Panama can be cited as an extreme example of the United States' violation of another country's national sovereignty. Mexico is no stranger to this type of abuse. Within the context of this subject several cases pertaining to Mexico can also be cited:

a. The kidnapping of Alvarez Machain

The events of April of 1991 are a poignant example of the violation of Mexico's sovereignty. Dr. Alvarez Machain was accused by the United States of being involved in the murder of DEA agent Camarena. Dr. Machain's sequester provoked a retaliatory wave of condemnations and accusations by the Mexican Government; President Salinas personally condemned the DEA's action. By the 26th of April, the DEA admitted participation in the kidnapping of Dr. Machain. They admitted to have paid a third party the sum of \$20,000 in order to carry out the kidnapping. After much deliberation on the issue, Federal Judge Edward Rafeedie of Los Angeles Federal Court, declared the kidnapping illegal. Despite this legal position, the US Ambassador to Mexico, John Dimitri Negroponte, said: "the U.S position on this matter is not to repatriate Dr. Machain." After several months Dr. Machain was brought to trial. After twenty months of pretrial and trial incarceration, on 14 December 1992 Dr. Machain was exonerated and released of all charges due to insufficient proofs. ¹⁹⁶Thus, it would seem that all this effort was to have been for naught. The only thing this flagrant display of

¹⁹⁶ Monterrey, Nuevo Leon. Mexico. El Norte de Monterrey. Dec 15/92.

indifference to national sovereignty would seem to have concluded is the re-affirmation of historical anti-US sentiment.

b. The Tianguis Automobilistico Issue

Another manner in which a country may violate another's sovereignty is through the use of extra-territoriality. That is, in our case, when the US tries to pursue it's own interests at the expense of Mexican citizens while in their own country. Take the Tianguis Automobilistico incident as a point in case. While investigating for stolen cars, FBI agents crossed the border into Ciudad Juarez, Mexico. They extended their search for these cars onto the streets of Ciudad Juarez. The investigation was approved and headed by agent David Duncan, the regional supervisor. The results of the search are not available; however, despite the search's effectiveness, the act of having conducted the search created tremendous repercussions. Jorge Mares Delgado, President of CANACO (the city's chamber of commerce), said:

"This search by FBI agents constitutes a violation of national sovereignty."¹⁹⁷

Similar outbursts were heard elsewhere; Domingo Suarez, a political party member of the Frente Cardenista de Reconstrucción, said: "These acts just create anxiety among the population of Ciudad Juarez because US police arrest persons in Mexico while investigating stolen cars in the United States."¹⁹⁸

¹⁹⁷ Mexico City, El Heraldo. August 24/93. By Porfirio Quiroga Garcia. Protestas por la Intervención del FBI en Ciudad Juárez.

¹⁹⁸ Mexico City, Ultimas Noticias. August 25/93. Agentes del FBI se Introducen Ilegalmente a México: PFCRN.

From the US perspective, it would be unthinkable to have Mexican agents roaming freely in the United States conducting investigations of miscellaneous stolen articles or drug users. Mexico has accepted almost any condition requested by the US government in order to maintain the good relations and fight the increasing US drug market.

c. Electoral Monitoring

Besides delicate issues within the antidrug campaign; there are other sensitive issues such as the US insistence on sending foreign observers to elections abroad. This clearly constitutes meddling in the internal affairs of another state and, of course, directly affects Mexico's national sovereignty.¹⁹⁹ In an act of reciprocity will Mexico send observers to monitor the US election process?

4. Mexico as Scapegoat: The Immigration Problem

Similarly to the violations of sovereignty are those directed against the immigrants citizens of said state. As has been previously mentioned, racism and second class treatment of undocumented Mexican workers is commonplace. Governor Pete Wilson of California has taken the forefront in an anti-immigrant campaign, and has used words as:

"California is under siege because the illegal immigration. It is time to make something to this respect; what is more, it is time to finish this issue." Later he added..."I

¹⁹⁹ Univision. May 19/94. Maria Antonieta Collins. Jorge Carpizo, Secretary of Government in Mexico, said "as a Mexican I censure that any foreigner wants to meddle in Mexico's internal affairs."

urged the Congress to refuse the Federal Laws that obliged the states to educate and give health care. ²⁰⁰and another benefits to undocumented immigrants."²⁰¹

Besides, Wilson has proposed the unconstitutional idea of denying citizenship status to the children of the undocumented workers born within the state. In other words, he intends to strip legal citizens of the United States of their citizenship; to leave them in virtual limbo.²⁰² Jaime Garcia a reporter from Univision when referring to Wilson's anti-immigrant campaign said Wilson:

"...has Presidential aspirations, and he considers that the best way to get there is through the California government. He raised his popularity from 15-48% through this aggressive anti-immigrant campaign."

As a consequence, since the beginning of Wilson' campaign, there has been growing anti-hispanic immigrant sentiment. Reporters of KSMS have called it "a witch hunt". A recent poll conducted by a S.F. journal showed that 2 of each 3 residents in the north of California think that undocumented workers are a drain of economic resources.²⁰³ This actions has had some inconveniences for the hispanic residents, as occurred to Eddie Cortes, major of Pomona Ca. when he was stopped in the street and surprisingly questioned and menaced by the police.²⁰⁴

²⁰⁰ In Tecate, CA, 300 students have been rejected from the elementary school. Loosing their education right, against the Constitutional and Supreme Court veredict over the rights of education (Rep. Xavier Becerra (D) California). KSMS Univision. May 3/94. By Armando Guzman. Over the Capitol.

²⁰¹ On August 9/94 Wilson said: "Our quality of life is threaten by the undocumented workers." With this words Wilson began his Anti-migrant Campaign. KSMS Channel 67 Salinas. May 3/94. By Maria Elena Salinas. California. Tierra Prohibida.

²⁰² El Sol de mexico. Oct 11/93. p.5A. By Mauricio Gonzalez de la Garza.

²⁰³ Univision. May 10/94. By Luis Megid from Sacramento Ca.

²⁰⁴ KSMS Channel 67. Univision. by Maria Elena Salinas. California. Tierra Prohibida.

Ironically, reactions to Governor Wilson's posture come from inside the United States. Ron Unz, (R), another candidate for governor, said:

"...with his words the current governor Wilson provoke an ethical division similar to the Bosnia division..."

Additionally Henry Cisneros, Department Housing and Urban Development when interviewed by Teresa Rodriguez²⁰⁵ said:

"As immigrants, to be successful, we must educate our youth, participate in politics, and take advantages of the economic opportunities of this country."

Probably the worst aspect of Wilson's campaign is the falseness of the data used. Grace Napolitano (D) President of the Immigration Committee in the State Assembly declared that "the statistics mentioned by Wilson are exaggerated and far from the reality."²⁰⁶ Mexican Senator Gustavo Salinas Iñiguez, member of the Senate Commission for Border Affairs and Secretary of the Trade Commission, said:

"California Governor Pete Wilson, uses Mexicans as scapegoats so he can get reelected. It is unfair for Wilson to accuse our fellow citizens of bleeding California's economy when their work is actually helping enrich it."²⁰⁷

These last two denunciations ratify Jaime Garcia's words mentioned above. The campaign jeopardizes the binational relation between Mexico and the United States.

²⁰⁵ Univision. May 4/94. Teresa Rodriguez. Primera persona.

²⁰⁶ Univision. May 10/94. By Luis Megid from Sacramento.

²⁰⁷ FBIS-LAT, 93-211, 3 NOV 93, p.21: Mexico City NOTIMEX 0219 GMT October 31/93. Senator Says US Politicians Use Mexicans as Scapegoats.

5. Political Interference

Mexico has also been the target of political meddling. Traditionally, US politicians adduce that Mexico does not have a democratic system because of the PRI's (Revolutionary Institutional Party) permanency in power for more than 65 years. Mexico is continuously criticized of supposed electoral fraud, and it is impossible to doubt that some times it has existed. But, what is the justification for meddling in the internal affairs of one's neighbor if he maintains peace and stability? Furthermore, on what moral basis are these denunciations made?

The PRI party has remained in power for a long time as an institution; but, people rotate in public offices. No one, as elective official can remain in office for more than one elective period. ²⁰⁸On the contrary, just to quote one example, Congressman Carl Vinson (D) of Georgia was ranking in the House of Naval Affairs Committee and then on the Armed Services Committee for nearly thirty years.²⁰⁹

With respect to political power, the PRI conserves all the power it can achieve. Certainly, it retains the governors' state power in 87% of the states of the Mexican Union,²¹⁰ and the 66% of the Mexican Congress (Camera), and the "opposition parties" most of the times argued fraud in elections. The democratic foreign observer --who does not know the "Mexican democratic system"--, ignores that most of the Mexican workers and Campesinos are enrolled in the PRI party through the CTM (Mexican Workers

²⁰⁸ Mexico's Constitution. Arts 59, 83, and 115.

²⁰⁹ Randall B. Ripley & James M. Lindsay. Congress Resurgent. Foreign and Defense Policy on the Capitol Hill. p.165.

²¹⁰ Except by the states of: Baja California, Chihuahua, San Luis Potosí and Yucatan.

Confederation) and the CNOC (National worker-peasants Confederation) which make really a strong party because the quantity of secure constituency. Besides, people from PRI party, are well known among the Mexican population and overall are more serious in their political perceptions. ²¹¹The PRI could not be the best, but currently at least is the better option;²¹² as a consequence looser political parties claim fraud in the election as an advertising for future electoral campaigns.

Riordan Roett wrote: "...in a subsequent hearing in June, Helms denounced Mexico's 1982 presidential elections as fraudulent and went so far as to suggest that President de la Madrid should resign."

This sequence of public imputations have been typified by at least one observer as "the worst official US criticism of Mexico since 1927."²¹³

Additionally, as a Senator from California in 1986, current California Governor Pete Wilson (R), declared that the 1986 elections in the Mexican State of Chihuahua were fraudulent, and demanded that President de la Madrid invalidate them and follow through on his earlier promises regarding the moralization and democratization of the Mexican political system.²¹⁴ Recently, Juan Ruiz Heally, when referring to Pete's Wilson moral

²¹¹ Demostenes Moreno (PRD) Deputy in the Chiapas Congress during the appointee of Chiapas provisional Governor attempting to be funny and ironic, voted for Commander Marcos of the revolt in Chiapas". Mexico City. Radio ACIR 0044 GMT May 19 January/94. In order to know more of this curious law infractor of Chiapas, the so-called Sub-commander Marcos, read the article in the San Jose Chronicle. pp.A10,14. By Trina Kleist. Mexican Rebel's Colorful Past. Additionally The New Yorker, May 16/94. By Alma Guillermo-prieto. Zapata's Heirs.

²¹² The so-called SubCommander Marcos, in an interview with Cuahutemoc Cardenas (PRD) candidate to the Presidency said: "The PRD (Democratic Revolution Party) is not the alternative for the shift into the democracy". Univision. May 16/94. By Maria Elena Salinas.

²¹³ Riordan Roett. Mexico and the United States. Managing the Relationship. p.228.

²¹⁴ Ibid.

quality, wrote: "Governor Pete Wilson has been identified as one of the most known anti-Mexican US politicians. He uses his attacks against the undocumented workers as a slogan for his reelection campaign."²¹⁵ So, where is the moral quality of which he speaks, and where are the democratic values when he puts his self-interest over the welfare of the people?

Robert Torricelli (D), a Congressmen from New Jersey, is another US politician who is critical of democratic values in Mexico. He is well known in Latin America for his infamous so-called "Torricelli Law".²¹⁶ He wants to "decertify"²¹⁷ Mexico because of the upheaval in Chiapas," said Mexico's Foreign Affairs Secretary, Manuel Tello Macias.²¹⁸ Additionally, on May 19, 1994, Torricelli again meddled in Mexico's internal affairs, now in the Mexican electoral issue,²¹⁹ when in a prejudiced manner he intervened in the US Congress by qualifying Mexican Electoral Process as a cheating one, even before the election takes place. This recalls the old "Recognition Government Policy" of the 1920s.

Torricelli has been linked with Jorge Mas Canosa²²⁰ and, as Linda Robinson wrote when referring to this relationship:

²¹⁵ Novedades. Oct 22/93. p13A. By Juan Ruiz Healy. A Fondo.

²¹⁶ The so-called Torricelli Law, is another example of some extraterritoriality laws of United States. Basically, it strengthen the economic blockade to Cuban Island while demanding that other governments act in the same way.

²¹⁷ See Sec 481 Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. Amendment 22 U.S.C. 2291.

²¹⁸ UNOMASUNO. By Ernesto Zavaleta. p10. The Representant Robert Torricelli (D) New Jersey.

²¹⁹ Toricelli in the US Congress stated: "whereas the presence of international observers can enhance the confidence of the mexican people that their votes will be respected." Later in an interview he said: "There is nothing worst than someone wins an election and no one believes it. This is not a concession for the US Government, it is in benefit for the real Mexican winner of the election. Univision. May 19/94. By Armando Guzman.

²²⁰ Jorge Mass Canosa is a fast made Cuban-American millionaire of Miami. He is also

Torricelli...denies that his close association with Mas compromises him or helps promote Mas's ambitions. A former Mas associate disagrees: Mas greases the hands of people [and] uses them...They're doing the same with Torricelli, and he's going to get burned²²¹

If the close relationship with Mas Canosa raises curiosity in the US press, his intimate relationship with Filanca Jagger -- ex-wife of Mick Jagger²²², and currently related to leftist movements -- has been generating even more of this type of report.²²³ Postures of US politicians like the ones mentioned above are frequent, and are originated because the politicians don't understand -- or at least, don't *seem* to understand -- that the character of the democratic system is different in each country.²²⁴ Democracy cannot be exported; there are no pre-fabricated models. Democracy is itself an internal process of each country.

6. The NAFTA Debates

In the bilateral relationship between Mexico and the United States, nothing is more riveting and irritating, due to the dialogues, than the statements and debates arising out of the NAFTA negotiations.

a. NAFTA's Statements

Former President Carter stated:

Mexico has a long road ahead of it to arrive at truly honest and democratic elections. If the US does not support the FTA (Free Trade Agreement), we will

President of the CANF (Cuban American National Foundation). US News & World Report. May 4/92. By Linda Robinson in Miami. Lobby Group's.

²²¹ US News & World Report. May 4/92. By Linda Robinson in Miami. Lobby Group's.

²²² Mick Jagger was always associated with drugs-consumption problems.

²²³ Vanidades de Mexico. Año 34 Numero 8. p.98.

²²⁴ Observe the electoral process of Panama, Salvador, South Africa or Mexico. All are different. All are democratic processes, but each one was affected by its cultural heritage and current environment, that make each one different.

have seem the end of any hope for us to have honest, democratic elections in Mexico in the near future.²²⁵

The US Republican Congressman James Leach, also a supporter of NAFTA, said:

"It is absolutely true that Mexico today is full of corruption. Thus, we will be taking a big risk by not passing the FTA and helping to reform that system."²²⁶

These cases are typical of the Mexican saying "No me ayudes Compadre" (Don't help me my friend). Both arguments are very difficult to distinguish from those of the NAFTA's adversaries.

b. Albert Gore-Ross Perot²²⁷

Clinton's Administration made its best effort to favorably support NAFTA during the debate between Vice President Albert Gore and the most visible anti-NAFTA figure, Ross Perot. During this debate, the irritation of the Mexicans cannot be raised more, because there is no more room. The harsh and insulting words of Ross Perot will pass to posterity as among the most offensive words pronounced from their northern neighbors. Words as "(until) the animals in the United States live better than a Mexican in his own country" or "the best aspiration of the Mexicans are to have a latrine and running water" are certainly words of a vulgar fellow. When such words are pronounced in front of the Vice-President of the United States, and before the TV cameras in a world-wide transmission, the impact and effects couldn't be worse.

²²⁵ Mexico, City. EXCELSIOR September 15/93. p.A1.

²²⁶ Mexico City. LA JORNADA. September 9/93. p.A1.

²²⁷ November 9, 1993.

As a consequence of this debate, all kinds of protests rose against Ross Perot in the United States itself: Jaime Enrique Felix, Coord. for Democratic Change in the PRD said:

Our country's public image was hurt in one way or another during this debate.

Hector Teran Teran, Senator (PAN):

This really shows tremendous lack of information about Mexico.

Oscar Mauro Ramirez, Representant of the Assembly, PARM:

Perot took a position against Mexico, against our social reality, against our culture, and against our forms of public and private political life.

Erberto Castillo, of the democratic change movement in the PRD:

"The mexican Government should have submitted an immediate protest rejecting the comments on our country's political system."

And finally, Hector Olivares, Senator PRI:

Remarks that are offensive to Mexico and the Mexicans people were made during the debate, making one consider the possibility of expressly prohibiting the entry into the country of those who abroad devote themselves to insulting and offending Mexico. We condemn Perot's statements because they are laden with racism and intolerance, and we reject them because of the disrespect and ignorance they express.

Ramon Sosa Montes, of PRD:

We insist that Mexico can't be part of a television show, as it was on November 9 and as it is now. It must reaffirm its sovereignty. As the PRD, we demand it.²²⁸

²²⁸ Mexico City XEW Television 0430 GMT Nov 11/93. 24 Horas newscast: Mexican

In this easy manner, there can be demonstrated the action and the reactions within this relationship, marked by the asymmetry of power. On one side the selfish interest of some politicians and the anxiety of those, who wants to be renewed by his absurd comments; and in the other side, the Mexicans endure those onslaughts. Together, the hegemonic position and the defensive one, and its output, the concept of sovereignty; the too valuable concept of the Mexicans.

7. Policy Inconsistencies

Independent of any historic social, economical, or military decision taken in the past, the policy of United States toward Mexico on drugs has had inconsistencies. The best example of this was during World War II. As related in words of Guadalupe Rodriguez;

In a strange historical about-face, the United States actually encouraged legal Mexican opium and hemp production during WWII on behalf of the Allied war effort...During the same year [1943], US officials reversed their pro-production approach toward Mexican drugs, again encouraged restriction, and even discussed the possibility of border searches for drugs.²²⁹

Decisions are quick to make, while the decision-action execution process takes more time. Mexico's implementation of the antidrug campaign during World War II took a great effort. The struggle in which Mexico continues is immersed, sometimes more, sometimes less involved, depends of the economical resources of the budget and other priorities of the Mexican Government's agenda.

Politician React to Gore-Perot Debate.

²²⁹ Guadalupe Gonzalez. The Drug Connection US- Mexican Relations. p.72.

An other example of foreign policy inconsistencies is the related direct cause-and-effect connection between rising US restraints on legitimate trade and the rise of trade in illicit drugs. It could be confirmed in the case of marijuana cultivation in Belize. As Congress repeatedly cut the amount of sugar Belize could sell to the United States, sugar farmers started growing marijuana. The irony is that while US policy pushes Caribbean sugar farmers into marijuana, US agricultural expert try to persuade cocagrowing peasants in Bolivia and Peru to cultivate other crops.²³⁰

A case of political inconsistencies, now in the socio-economical field, is the anti-migrant actions along the US-Mexican border. While the United States puts up a three-meter metal wall²³¹ to prevent the crossing of "illegal aliens" from Mexico into US territory; the US politicians encourage illegal departures from Cuba and Haiti.

8. A Profitable Business

Besides the political attacks from the US politicians and from ordinary people that want to be recognized, there are some writers of "yellow journalism" that write books accessible to all the people in order to make profits. James Mills, in his best selling book "The Underground Empire: Where Crime and Government Embrace" mentions, "Mexico is probably the most corrupt nation on earth...." Later, he wrote, "75% of the export earnings of Mexico and of Colombia are probably drug profits."

²³⁰ Headline Series. No 290. Fall 1989. Merrill Collett. The Cocaine Connection. Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. p.65.

²³¹ Similar to the one they brought down in Berlin, although that wall was of concrete.

When a country is getting 75% of its total exports earnings from drugs, there is a country that is purely and simply in the drug business. Later James Mills, before the Representatives in the House, said:

...I think the President has to say, we have tried stopping drugs at the borders. It has not worked, and it is not going to work..Mexico is the major exporter to the United States of marijuana, heroin, and amphetamines. He can go from country to country quoting the statistics, and say these are hostile acts. We are, in effect, at war with these countries.²³²

Similar is the case of the writer Elaine Shanon in his book "Desesperados. Latin Drug Lords, US Lawmen, and the War America Can't Win." In this book, the author describes the DEA agent Camarena as a super-hero, while the Mexicans are the corrupt and bad villains.

Books like this, and statements before the Representatives, could shift the image of the neighbors and motivate the constituencies to change the policies toward Mexico, jeopardizing in such a way the evolution of the good relationship.

F. THE GOOD NEWS IN US-MEXICO RELATIONS

Progress in the relationship between the two countries continues, contrary to the hegemony and attitudes of leadership of the United States Government with regard to the process of its policies toward Mexico, opposed to the mischievous posture of politicians that seek their own benefits through misleading political campaigns which had influenced

²³² United States-Mexican Cooperation Efforts in Narcotics Control Efforts July 17, 1986. pp.3-55.

the population toward segregation instead of unity, and on the contrary to the eagerness of richness and power without caring much which methods are used to obtain them.

Spurring progress has been the will of the population of the United States and among them, those who have been seeking for the power that will make them able to please the needs of society in which we have lived. Historical men as Abraham Lincoln and John Quincy Adams, or brave men from the San Patrick Battalion; and more recent figures, such as Milton Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and George Bush; names that will be remembered forever.

The solidarity of US society has promoted on many occasions the understanding between the United States and Mexico, and also has worked hard to help the Mexican people when they have faced geographical and meteorological adversities. Both nations have fought together against a common enemies, such as drugs, that have been poisoning the blood of of their youth.

Along the Mexico-US border the interaction of both societies has grown stronger each day. This is an inestimable matured symbol of integration between both societies; and as professor Porrua lectured in his university classes: "This is the common wealth of the people."

The first three years of the new Mexican administration have enhanced this inter-relation between Mexico and the United States. NAFTA, which took effect on January 1, 1994, will be the catalyst to accelerate the maturity of the relation among both

nations and at the same time will maintain the respect to the sovereignty of both countries.

V. NAFTA: THE NEW ENVIRONMENT

"... to make the most of the new opportunities open to us, we must improve our working partnerships in this hemisphere-between countries north and south;between government , business, and labor. . ." George Bush²³³

A. INTRODUCTION

This Bush approach highlights free trade in the hemispheres as the cornerstone of a new inter-American era of cooperation. Since the Jeffersonian epoch to the Good Neighbor policy and the Alliance for Progress initiative, the idea of a single hemisphere guided by one ordinance and expressing one language, has been the invariable US approach to hemispheric issues. It emphasized the need for a hemispheric order, directed by the United States as a hegemonic power, and structured around joined policies and multilateral institutions.

Mexico looked to a free trade agreement with the United States basically as a means of attracting foreign investment, because Mexican investors were unlikely to be able to afford the required investment; besides this, the agreement also reinforces Mexico's prominence as an export position to the United States. On the contrary, for the United States the agreement unveils a vast unprotected market, besides promoting the welfare of its southern neighbor by increasing job opportunities, boosting its political stability, and reducing, in the long run, the immigration problem.

²³³ "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative", May, 1990.

Additionally, the so-called parallel agreements completely adhere to the principles and regulations established in the Constitutions and policies of each of the countries. The first agreement deals with environmental cooperation, seeking to foster the protection of the environment in each of the countries' laws. The second parallel agreement focuses on labor issues. It seeks to contribute to the well-being of workers in the three countries through the implementation of existing laws and the exchange of information.

B. NAFTA: ITS HISTORY AND TEACHING

During the 1980 presidential campaign, both the conservative candidate Ronald Reagan and the liberal Jerry Brown proposed the creation of a North American Common Market (involving the United States, Canada, and Mexico).²³⁴ But it was during the tenure of President George Bush, when the transformation of the US policy toward Latin America instituted the emergence of a new pattern of cooperation in the Western Hemisphere based on a commitment to economic partnership in the new world order. The importance of Mexico for the Bush administration was highlighted in August 1989 when half the Cabinet traveled to Mexico for a working session of the US-Mexico bilateral commission.²³⁵ The purpose of this meeting was to search for their countries' common interest -- *their mutual political and economic stability*.

In May, 1991, the fast track vote took place, marking the beginning of the final phase of effort directed toward completing the agreement. From June 1991 to August

²³⁴ Riordan Roett. *Mexico and the United States: Managing the Relationship*, p. 224.

²³⁵ FOREIGN AFFAIRS, by Abraham F. Lowenthal, Rediscovering Latin America, p. 29.

1992, negotiations were conducted. Further negotiations regarding the parallel agreements were conducted from March to August 1993. During the negotiation process, three principles became fundamental: absolute respect for Mexican sovereignty; preservation of the basic agreement; and agreement that the parallel agreements not become a mechanism for "unjustified" protectionism. NAFTA reunited the populations of Canada (27 million), Mexico (86 million), and the US (256 million). The NAFTA countries produce 18% of the world's exports, and cover an area of 21.132 sq km.

Finally, the three governments, represented by Prime Minister Mulroney, President Salinas, and President Clinton, signed the treaty on September 13 and 14, 1993. It is interesting to note that President Clinton brought all of his political weight to bear to force Congressional approval of the agreement by January 1, 1994.

President Salinas, a graduate of a US university, knew about lobbies and the various political maneuvering involved in the passage of any US legislation. The Salinas Administration made contributions to George Bush's reelection campaign, and spent between 25 and 40 million dollars over three years on a pro-NAFTA campaign, *thereby becoming involved in the domestic politics of its northern neighbor*.²³⁶ Ross Perot, a severe critic of President Clinton and the spearhead of resistance to NAFTA, observed this new phenomenon and called on Congress *to ban such practices by foreign governments*.

On November 18, 1993, the US House of Representatives approved NAFTA.

²³⁶ Herminio Blanco, head of the Mexican negotiating team for NAFTA, reported that the cost of lobbying and negotiations for the complementary agreements alone was 42 million pesos. Reported on the Mexico City XHTV Television Network by Cristina Pelaez.

TABLE VII. THE HOUSE VOTE ON NAFTA.	
Pro-NAFTA	234
Votes Against	200
Republican Party	132 to 43 in favor
Democratic Party	102 to 156 in favor

C. IMPACT OF NAFTA

This process was observed closely by most of the Latin American nations, and was thought to have more of a potential political impact than an economic one. Rejection of NAFTA, asserted Chilean President Alwin, would "send a negative signal to Latin America as a whole."²³⁷ The lack of significance attached to the economic impact of the agreement was primarily due to the fact that more than 70% of Mexico's trade was with the US, and more than 6% of its entire workforce was employed in the US, at the time of ratification. This exported workforce sends at least \$4 billion back to Mexico each year.²³⁸

In NAFTA, Mexico sees the opportunity for commercial openings. This level of opportunity is expected to lead Mexicans to staying in Mexico for work, rather than traveling to the United States, where they encounter all kinds of humiliation and racist attitudes. As Jaime Serra Puche, Mexican Secretary of Commerce, said:²³⁹

NAFTA is another instrument within the president's economic policy. It is an instrument that will allow us to grow more and generate jobs more quickly. These

²³⁷ FBIS-LAT, 93-199, 18 OCT 94, p. 27: Mexico City Canal 13 Television, 1300 GMT October 15, 1993.

²³⁸ Lowenthal, Abraham F., *Latin America: Ready for Partnership?*, p.87.

²³⁹ FBIS-LAT, 93-183, 23 SEP 93, p. 14: Mexico City Channel 13 Television, GMT 1319, September 22, 1993.

are instruments that have produced results like lowering the inflation rate, increasing growth, finding public financing, renegotiating foreign debt. NAFTA is an instrument that will make us more competitive and create more jobs in the long run. We should not expect immediate results, but long-term results.

Mexico could become increasingly important for the US, given the emerging world trend toward regionalism. This is perhaps what compels the US to turn inward in the relationship, examining more closely the interdomestic relationship in such issues as unemployment/immigration, drug trafficking and consumption, environmental concerns, and others. The solutions to these issues between Mexico and the US will consequently influence the relationship of the US to the rest of the Western Hemisphere. The Latin American region as a whole is looking to the development of the US-Mexican relationship to see whether it is possible to form a growth-oriented hemispheric relationship that will increase the welfare of their respective populations and continental security.

As an advanced developing country, Mexico does not need economic assistance, but rather more open trade and/or financial policies. The establishment of such policies is crucial to the Mexico-US relationship, where trade and investment are at one and the same time the most promising and most risky areas of cooperation. The actions of President Salinas seem to be moving in the direction of trade, technology transfer, foreign investment and exchange, and economic and employment growth.

Mexico's foreign debt at the end of December, 1993 was \$78.747 billion. This represents 21.4% of the country's GNP.²⁴⁰ Mexico received \$15.6 billion in investment in

²⁴⁰ FBIS-LAT, 94-036, 23 FEB 94, p. 10: Mexico City NOTIMEX, GMT 2108, February 18, 1994.

1993, while in January, 1994 alone, investment totaled \$2.370 billion. This represents 86% of the total investment during the first half of 1993.²⁴¹ The largest foreign investors in Mexico during the last six years were: United States, 63.8%; France, 4.5%; United Kingdom, 4.5%; Switzerland, 4.4%; Germany, 3.5%; Netherlands, 2.5%; and Japan, 2.0%. The US would benefit from more stable economic policies in Mexico, making it a more attractive location for capital inflow and for joint production activities. Direct investment is not only another source of capital, it also opens the way for technological progress in production, marketing, and industrial organization.

Serra Puche has reported that last year Mexico increased its exports to Canada by 100 percent, which indicates that NAFTA is beginning to yield favorable results for the national economy.²⁴² Jan Burchett, Canadian Consul in Mexico, said that "the interest showed by over 5,000 Canadian companies to do business with Mexicans within the framework of NAFTA will encourage Canadian exports."²⁴³ While the trade between Mexico and the United States, grew from \$40,000 million in 1989 to \$75,000 million in 1993.²⁴⁴ As an example of this market expansion can be cited by the 5,202 vehicles that were imported to Mexico last January. Customs officials reported that this amount is little over 1,000 percent higher than in January 1993.²⁴⁵

An additional benefit of NAFTA is the increase in Mexican wages and standard of living, which serves to decrease the pressure for unauthorized immigration into the US²⁴⁶

²⁴¹ FBIS-LAT, 94-053, 18 MAR 94, p. 16: Mexico City NOTIMEX, GMT 1523, March 14, 1994.

²⁴² Mexico City *La Jornada*, February 28, 1994, p. 52.

²⁴³ Mexico City *El Financiero*, March 14, 1994, p. 29.

²⁴⁴ Mexico City *La Prensa*, July 22, 1993.

²⁴⁵ Mexico City *La Jornada*, February 28, 1994, p. 54-64.

²⁴⁶ The Monterey Herald, October 17, 1994, p. 13a.

1. The Immigration Problem

The immigration problem within the relationship was prompted by Mexico's development model which in recent years has been inactive and unable to create more sources of employment for the growing population. It appears Mexico's most efficient production capabilities are baby factories. Former President Lopez Portillo during his tenure made reference to the immigration problem noting that "we prefer to export products rather than people."²⁴⁷ These words were reiterated by President Salinas during an interview in San Francisco, CA., last year, referring to the NAFTA-Immigration delima, he said:

We have to build new point of reference. We have to build new institutions. We have to build new certainties. We want to export goods not people... I must explain, we want trade and not aid. In fact, he said, Mexicans who venture across the border are courageous people willing to take risks to find work. That is why we want them in Mexico.²⁴⁸

The aggravating dilemma of NAFTA is that once tariffs are lifted, not all industries will be able to compete successfully and many will be forced out of business. Some workers will lose their jobs, and some districts will be left in an economic quagmire. For the losers, the fact that Mexico and the United States as a whole will be better off is no compensation for their loss. Fidel Valazquez, leader of the CTM (Confederation of Mexican Workers), confirmed on February 23 that there are 7 million unemployed persons in Mexico.²⁴⁹ The same source states that under the Salinas

²⁴⁷ Alan Riding, *Distant Neighbors: A Portrait of the Mexicans*, p. 483.

²⁴⁸ The Monterey Herald, September 20, 1993.

²⁴⁹ FBIS-LAT, 94-038, 25 FEB 94, p. 11: Mexico City, XEW Television, GMT 0435, February 24, 1994.

Administration 10 million Mexicans lost their jobs, and those who retained jobs did not receive any benefits or social security, earning less than the minimum wage. The labor situation in the country was described as "alarming" because no new jobs were created between 1992 and 1993.²⁵⁰ According to the National Institute of Geography, Statistics, and Data Processing, 588,000 manufacturing workers lost their jobs in 1993.

For the United States, it is important that Mexico achieve rapid progress in employment creation, in order to relieve pressure in the migration problem. Currently, there are about 10 million Mexicans living in US territory. The "Maquiladora Program" constituted by assembly industries deployed along the US/Mexican border, have notably contributed to stemming the flow of immigrants to the US. Almost 2 million workers from Central and South America have been absorbed by this program, rather than becoming "illegals" in the US.²⁵¹

Former Government Secretary Jose Patrocino Gonzalez Blanco-Garrido announced last October the creation of the National Migration Institute (INM), which will strengthen and expand the functions of the General Directorate of Migration Services; especially for those cases stemming from migration, which has economic, social, and, occasionally, political motives.²⁵²

²⁵⁰ Mexico City, *La Jornada*, March 9, 1994, pp. 1,52.

²⁵¹ FBIS-LAT, 93-224, 23 NOV 93, p. 23: Rio de Janeiro, *O Globo*, November 19, 1993, p. 6.

²⁵² FBIS-LAT, 93-196, 13 OCT 93, p. 14: Mexico City Television Canal 13, GMT 1300, October 11, 1993.

2. The Drug Trafficking Problem

The increase in interdependency will also increase cross border commercial traffic. Since the NAFTA went into effect on January 1, 1994, Mexican exports to the US have comprised 80% of its total exports. The increase in traffic of non-duty goods has increased the level of opportunity to smuggle drugs in north-bound traffic for two reasons: First, the customs agents who might identify potential drug smuggling shipments no longer engage in the processes associated with former duties, which have often led to drug seizures. Second, the sheer volume of traffic reduces law enforcement agency ability to apprehend drug shipments.

California, 23 miles east of San Diego, is normally the second-busiest commercial port of entry on the Mexican border. An average of 1,033 trucks from Mexico enter daily, crossing between San Ysidro, California, and Tijuana, Mexico are approximately 1,100 trucks each day.²⁵³ In Laredo, Texas, which is the terminus of Interstate Highway 35 and the busiest crossing point on the Rio Grande, the number of trucks heading south has jumped to 800,000 last year, compared to 185,000 in 1987. Texas has 23 international border crossings -- 20 bridges, two dam crossings, and one hand-drawn ferry -- and there are proposals for at least 11 more.²⁵⁴ These new crossings will be built to accommodate the increased northward and southward bound traffic, but more customs agents will be required as well, to stop northbound drugs and southbound arms.

²⁵³

The New York Times, January 3, 1994.

²⁵⁴

Ibid., November 30, 1993.

One of the principal benefits offered by NAFTA is the opportunity for the US and Mexico to work more closely with one another to stop drug trafficking. In a joint declaration, the two countries' Attorneys General stressed that the approval of NAFTA will result in a closer and more intense cooperation in the fight against drug trafficking and organized crime. Former Attorney Jorge Carpizo made the following remarks,

. . . the strengthening of the climate of respect and joint responsibility that NAFTA will bring about will permit an increase in Mexican and US capabilities to fight drug trafficking and other crimes such as organized crime, money laundering, and gunrunning.²⁵⁵

Mexico's economic crisis is not a theoretical issue for the exclusive concern of economists. It directly affects the peasant farmers who, for instance, are vulnerable to the promises of drug profits. There is, therefore, a requirement for rural development, as pointed out by Kempe Hope:²⁵⁶

The cardinal aim of rural development is viewed not simply as agricultural and economic growth in the narrow sense, but as balanced social and economic development, including the generation of new employment; the equitable distribution of income; widespread improvement in health, nutrition, and housing; greatly broadened opportunities for all individuals to realize their full potential through education; and a strong voice for all rural people in shaping the decisions and actions that affect their lives.

The Procampo Plan ("pro-countryside") in Mexico is a reactive agricultural development plan that follows the Kempe approach with the suppluses of the 92 budget and an additional investment of 11.7 billion pesos. This plan has benefitted over 3

²⁵⁵ FBIS-LAT, 93-196, 13 OCT 93, p. 14: Mexico City Canal 13, GMT 1300, October 12, 1993.

²⁵⁶ McDonald, Scott B., *Mountain High, White Avalanche: Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama*, p. 136.

million farmers through direct subsidies and has included producers of corn, beans, wheat, soy, sorghum, rice, and cotton.²⁵⁷ This is one of the best mechanisms through which the Mexican Government is trying to stop drug cultivation within the new environment of NAFTA.

D. THE NEW EVENTS

President Salinas is reinstalling a commitment to social welfare expenditures. More accurately, perhaps, he is elevating the commitment to social development as he rolls back the state's interest in other sectors. The tool for social development has been the PRONASOL (National Solidarity Program) but, because the organization's logo bears the national colors, some critics claim that it is instead a vehicle to advance the interests and constituency of the PRI government. As a result of this program, the State of Chiapas, with 2.7% of the country's population, received 1,590 billion pesos over the last five years, which accounts for 6.44% of all PRONASOL disbursements in Mexico's 31 state and federal districts. On December 25, 1993, Social Development Secretary Carlos Rojas Gutierrez stated that PRONASOL's national budget for 1994 would be 8.8 billion pesos.²⁵⁸

In a speech to the Mexican population, President Salinas said,

Some people tried, with arguments, to shun the greatness of the Mexican people. Those people were defeated by a clear will to establish a new kind of relationship in North America and to follow on the world's dynamic tendency toward changes. Now, we will increase our efforts, we will continue to consolidate

²⁵⁷ FBIS-LAT, 93-193, 7 OCT 93, p. 11: Mexico City Canal 13, GMT 1333, October 5, 1993.
²⁵⁸ Mexico City, *La Jornada*, December 16, 1993.

our reforms. We will keep our economic path, we will strengthen our domestic market, and we will take additional steps so that more fellow countrymen, especially those who have the least, enjoy greater well-being.²⁵⁹

Suprisingly, the so-called *Ejercito Zapatista de Liberacion Nacional* (EZLN)²⁶⁰ declared war on the Mexican Government on January 1, 1994, and occupied four major offices in the State of Chiapas. During the confrontation between these outlaws and the army, there was an unofficial death toll of 200 in 11 days, after which President Salinas, in a goodwill gesture, ordered the Mexican Army to engage in a unilateral cease-fire.²⁶¹

As a result of the conflict in Chiapas, the Mexican stock market dropped 6.3%. Pedro Noyola, Deputy Secretary of foreign Commerce and Investment at the Secretariat of Commerce, in an attempt to maintain financial stability, said, "Investment projects are still strong. . . nearly 500 foreign investment projects aimed to strengthen the textile, agro-industrial, tourism, commerical, and manufacturing sectors starting this year."²⁶² Nevertheless, there was a flight of \$6,500 million in capital. The US came to the rescue of its new economic partner with \$6,000 million to ease the critical situation.

US Representative Robert Toriccelli (D) made the following comment:

The United States should make very clear to the Mexican Government the type of political reforms required if we are to maintain a new relationship.

Such comments are unfriendly and offensive.²⁶³

²⁵⁹ FBIS-LAT, 93-221, 18 NOV 93, p. 23: Mexico City XEW Television, GMT 0508, November 18, 1993.

²⁶⁰ This revolt had some interesting characteristics: 1) It began the same day that NAFTA was implemented; 2) It was integrated as an army of one state within another state; 3) Uniforms were considered more important than weapons; 4) It claimed a socialist doctrine; 5) It desired to "internationalize" the conflict by seeking the "support of Washington"

²⁶¹ FBIS-LAT, 94-011, 18 JUN 94, p. 28: Paris AFP, GMT 2046, January 17, 1994.

²⁶² FBIS-LAT, 94-021, 1 FEB 94, p. 8: Paris AFT, GMT 1421, January 26, 1994.

EZLN's message to President Clinton, the US Congress, and the US people asked if they had "approved the military and economic aid to combat drug trafficking and to kill Indians in the south-eastern part of Mexico."²⁶⁴

In contrast to the peace of the past and the future benefits anticipated with the passage of NAFTA, violent activities, such as the Chiapas revolt, jeopardized political stability and promoted a false image of insecurity, which provoked the flight of capital and the deterioration of foreign investment.

Such violent activity includes: the kidnapping of Alfredo Harpén, the main shareholder of BANAMEX (The National Mexican Bank); the kidnapping of Angel Osada, owner of the retail store chain *Gigante*; the assassination of Luis Donaldo Colosio, PRI candidate for the Mexican presidency; the assassination of the PGR Commander who was investigating the Colosio case; the banning of US products by local authorities; and a student demonstration in San Luis Potosí which resulted in the burning of 100 buses over a dispute arising out of a bus ticket price increase. All of these events seem to contribute to a generally unstable environment regarding the process and development of NAFTA.

²⁶³ FBIS-LAT, 94-011, 18 JAN 94, p. 22: Madrid EFE, GMT 1929, January 15, 1994.

²⁶⁴ FBIS-LAT, 94-011 18 JAN 94, p. 28: Paris, *El Tiempo*, GMT 2046, January 17, 1994.

VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

For the inhabitants of North America, one of the most fascinating subjects should be the study of inter-relationships that exist amongst the three countries: Canada, the United States and Mexico. In the northern portion, the culture of most influence stems from european background and anglo-saxon heritage. To the south is the latin culture, which is primarily based on conservative spanish beliefs. These two distinct societies are destined to share a contiguous land mass for the remainder of their existence.

The history of these societies is marred with both conquests and defeats; one destined to grow in accordance with it's belief in manifest destiny at the expense of the other; a highlight in the history of the world accentuated with conflagrations and struggle.

Their proximity has also caused meaningful side effects. The United States, while more powerful and prepared to use that power for its own ends, has clearly served as a catalyst to initiate the formation of a Mexican national identity. Mexican rhetoric is accentuated with a continuous call for unity; it is necessary because unity, for them, has become synonymous with security and, therefore, supported by the strong concept of national sovereignty.

In the dynamic world of international relations, one country is often defined by the capabilities or limitations of a neighbor. In this case, Mexico becomes a threat to the well-being of the United States if it is perceived as being weak. The problems which are

generated within this context may become serious threats if they are not addressed within time. Within the myriad inter-domestic problems that exist between the US and Mexico, the ones which draw greatest attention in terms of magnitude and potential threat are those of drug trafficking and illegal immigration. However, in relation to other pressing world problems, these issue have taken a back seat, in accordance with the US agenda. This has been true in the past, and it appears that US interests and policy priorities may continue to be dominated by Europe (including the former Soviet Union) and Asia.

Mexico's lackluster economic performance is often cited as one of the reasons why drug production is so attractive to its peasant population. Also, given the shortcomings of the Mexican economy in the last three administrations, the underground empire of drugs has indirectly assisted the government's economic growth agenda. It has created jobs, and addressed other economic issues that have had the effect of ebbing the national debt. Moreover, there have even been cases in which Latin American drug traffickers have offered to repay their country's external debt in return for amnesty.²⁶⁵ Even so, though drug production/ trafficking has tangible benefits for Mexico and its population, it cannot be justified under these terms because it constitutes a threat to the societies of both countries.

The problem is multi-faceted. Drug trafficking is not a Mexican problem in its origin; this has already been alluded to above. Nor is it only a US-specific problem. It is

²⁶⁵ MacDonald mentions examples in Peru and Bolivia. But in Mexico, Caro Quintero --one of the main accused in the Camarena case--, offered also in less than five years pay the Mexico's external debt. Scott B. MacDonald. *Mountain High, White Avalanche. Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama*. P.134. (for example, in Peru and Bolivia).

a problem caused by both the demand in the US and the supply via Mexico (both through production and trans-shipment). Thus, campaigns against only production are useless; as well as those against drug use only. An effective anti-drug program must encompass all aspects of the drug trafficking equation. In this manner, by attacking both supply and demand, can the menace that drugs pose be at least diminished if not completely eliminated.

Also, consider that big money is not made by the cultivation of drug crops by themselves; but rather through the infrastructure it requires to get the illegal product to its market. For instance, the traffickers' clandestine landing strips in remote rural regions will not be open for legitimate products, they construct tunnels underneath the US/Mexican border and use other expensive assets to transport the merchandise to its destination. The inherent risk involved with this type of operation all contribute to the expensive price tag that drug traffickers must pay. Additionally, the cost of the drug is elevated, sometimes up to 800%, within the distribution net of the drug dealers. In all, these operating costs are passed on to the consumer through exorbitant price increases at the time of purchase.

This problem is everyone's problem. From Mexico's perspective, it expends great amounts of money, effort, and resources, even human lives, in the battle against drug production and trafficking. But this alone has not and will not solve the problem. Also, there exists a feeling amongst Mexican nationals that the United States' war on drugs grates on Mexican nationalism. For instance, imagine how US people would react to

PGR agents from Mexico carrying weapons and directing independent investigations on US soil, or to use herbicides (paraquat) and police practices that are banned in Mexico. As long as antisocial and corrupt elements within both countries continue to organize the production, finance, purchase, distribution, and consumption of drugs, it will require great cooperation between the two countries to combat the rising tide of drugs. From the US side, the supply-side approach of crop eradication and high-seas interdiction will have to be made part of a larger, more comprehensive solution. As an editorialist for the New York Times said: "It is not that the United States lost the war on drugs, it is rather that we never really decided to get into it."²⁶⁶ What is required is a menu of flexible and realistic options. As Dr. Reuter notes in a recent Rand study, "unfortunately, there is abundant evidence that the external policies adopted by the United States for the control of drugs have failed. The failures of US international programs are not the result of incompetency or inadequate resources; they are found inherently in the structure of the problem. They will do very little to reduce drug abuse in the United States."²⁶⁷

Although the drug problem itself has no one single point of origin or cause, the acts of political finger-pointing generate another issue. Blame and accusations have been a common practice by some politicians; more so with US representatives. Some US politicians, motivated by their own personal agendas, have used Mexico's socio-economic and political shortcomings as an excuse to cast Mexico as a scapegoat on these issues. By the same token, because of this same asymmetry which exists, Mexico has had to

²⁶⁶ Gregory F. Treverton. *Antinarcotics Strategies and US Latin American relations*. p 140.

²⁶⁷ Peter Reuter, "Eternal Hope: America's International Effort". Rand Corporation. Feb. 1987.

learn to cope with these baseless and subjective accusations. All this in spite of the fact that corruption and violence, as collateral issues of the drug trafficking problem, exist on both sides of the border; violence being a larger problem in the US, while corruption is more rampant in Mexico. There is nothing to be benefited by trying to lay blame and make recriminations. However, even among the best of friends, distrust proliferates. The major exception to the expectation of better bilateral relations is the drugs interdiction effort. In spite of serious improved cooperation between the two nations' drug enforcement agencies in recent years, Mexicans feel that the United States can and must do more to discourage drug abuse at home.

A working solution to the problem must explore new avenues of approach and implementation. For instance, if the United States wants to assist Mexico with its antidrug program, the United States must integrate drug control in hand with other Mexican priorities. The United States must learn that so long as drug trafficking continues to be so profitable with consumers, the cost of their best efforts to stop drugs from passing via Mexican territory will continue to rise. As it is now, the current struggle to repress drug trafficking by both the US and Mexico is insufficient in order to win. As partners, they must change current practices and recognize that this problem is one that concerns everyone in both countries, and that it is not something to be treated as a remote issue.

The realization of this concept has recently come to light. Bruce Babbitt has stated: "The challenge for both our countries is to work together toward a coherent, generally

understood and accepted set of bilateral policies grounded in a realistic understanding of the possibilities --and limitations-- imposed by historical and cultural realities."²⁶⁸ This sentiment was echoed in a prepared statement by Ann B. Wroblewski, that the spirit of cooperation was very much the theme sounded by President Reagan on June 3, when he met with 24 Mexican Legislators: "Where there is friction that is to be expected between friends, we must both try to find the true source of conflict and work for a solution. Nothing of value in this world is free or comes easy, even good relations between neighbors. I am personally confident about the nature of our future relations."²⁶⁹

In summary, the following are the main points that the United States and Mexico must strengthen in order to properly address the issue. They are consistent and should be considered in the design of their international policies. They should be based on mutual respect and acceptance of a geographic proximity that cannot be changed.

- ♦ The United States must acknowledge that the differences in the interests of these two nations derive from different historical experiences and levels of development and must respect those differing interests. Aggression and intervention cannot solve the problem. Aggressive words, such as, "only in the 'banana republics' could a Latin American...." and so on. Such should not be in a politician's vocabulary. Nor is the symptom manifest itself only on US rhetoric; there are deep anti-US feelings that manifest themselves in some Latin American speeches.

²⁶⁸ Susan Kaufman Purcell. *Mexico in Transition. Implications for US Policy. Essays from Both Sides of the Border.* ppvi-vii.

²⁶⁹ United States -Mexican Cooperation in Narcotics Control Effort. July 17,1986. House of Representatives. Prepared Statement of Ann B. Wroblewski, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Department of States. p.80.

- ♦ In order to obtain optimal results from their respective binational policies, the areas of coincidence, or common interest, should be examined and built upon together, in a mutually respecting framework.
- ♦ The United States must not pressure and, most of all, must not intervene in Mexico's internal political activity. Pressure against Mexico serves no purpose in this global war. Instead, it should collaborate in efforts to make Mexico a prosperous and stable country, without expecting Mexico to sacrifice its national identity, sovereignty or its independence.
- ♦ Although good personal relations between high government officials are helpful in carrying out fruitful negotiations, they cannot compensate for differences of interest that exist between the two countries.

To Mexico, the maintenance of the pertinent independence of the past within the setting of an open economy and trade blocs is too high a price to pay for Mexico's elites and possibly for the country as a whole. However, the perspective of better living conditions in the long run have made the current government take this risk. Mexico made the most dramatic move toward U.S.-Mexico cooperation when President Carlos Salinas de Gortari and his team began to pursue NAFTA.

As asserted by Jorge Carpizo, Secretary of Government: "The strengthening of the climate of respect and joint responsibility that NAFTA will bring about will permit an

increase in Mexican and US capabilities in fighting drug trafficking and other crimes such as organized crime, money laundering, and gunrunning."

Treatment and the solution to this overwhelming problem will require time, dedication and effort on the behalf of both countries involved since Government coercion in a democratic country cannot substitute in place for an individual's decisions; and any attempt to reduce drug consumption will only create a black market for it, and its associated problems of violence, delinquency and corruption. A viable solution must address all aspects of the issue. Such as:

- Demand Side

1. A higher guidance effort about drugs in US universities and adult education programs, in attaching to programs currently in place for young school children.
2. Reorientation of distribution of resources: attack the demand side of the problem through prevention programs, treatment and rehabilitation.
3. Redefine the drugs and include the so-called soft drugs, that produce more fatalities and murders.
4. A mass mobilization and sensibilization about the consequences of drug use and an involvement of every sector of the community; discourage experimentation with, acceptance and consumption of drugs.

- Supply Side

1. Greater patronage for neighborhood organizations in the inner cities to retake, reconstruct, and revitalize neighborhoods.

2. Stronger penalties against drug producers, traffickers and dealers as well as hard users.
3. Greater restriction of guns (the trade in drugs and guns is often connected).
4. Greater supervision of US chemicals that are exported to Latin America that could be used for drug production.

Although the list is not all inclusive, it demonstrates the degree at which the problem could be addressed.

While the historical relationship between Mexico and the US has been marked, at various times and for various reasons, by disagreement, distrust, and political name-calling, the NAFTA agreement represents the possibility for cooperation that exists in the future. While the problems that exist may seem to be insurmountable, it must be recalled that the formation of environments within which to foster cooperative relations is among the most difficult of foreign policy tasks. As the peoples of Mexico and the US learn to live with one another, accepting the various elements which comprise their national characters, there is every expectation that progress on issues of mutual concern will continue to be made, and that disagreements can be resolved in the resulting framework.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arrieta, Carlos G. *Narcotrafico en Colombia*.

Barry, Tom Browne, Harry, and Sims, Beth. *The Challenge of US-Mexico Relations in the 1990's*.

Bush, George, US President, "Enterprise for the Americas Initiative", May, 1990.

Coatsworth, John H. and Rico, Carlos. *Images of Mexico in the United States*.

Collett, Merrill, Headline Series. No 290. Fall 1989. *The Cocaine Connection. Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations*.

Congress, Senate. 101st Cong., 2nd Sess., 13 June 1990.

Craig, Richard. *US Narcotics Policy toward Mexico: Consequences for the Bilateral Relationship*.

Craig, Richard, "Operación Intercepción: una Política de Presión Internacional". Foro Internacional 86:22 Octubre-Diciembre 1981).

Department of Defense Appropriations Bill, 1994. Sept 22, 1993.

DoD's Budget FY94.

Drug Control. Impact of DoD's Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow. GAO Sept. 1991. p.28.

Drug Control. Impact of DoD's Detection and Monitoring on Cocaine Flow. GAO. Sept 1991.

Drug Control. How Drug-Consuming Nations Are Organized for the War on Drugs. GAO June 1990.

Drug Interdiction. Operation Autumn Harvest: A National Guard-Customs Anti-Smuggling Effort. GAO June 1988.

Drug War. Air Force Times. 25 December 1989.

El NORTE. Monterey 17 August 93. Money Laundering Investigations Under Way.

El Sol de Mexico. Oct 11/93. p.5A. By Mauricio Gonzalez de la Garza.

Erb, Richard D. and Ross, Stanley R.. United States Relations with Mexico. Context and Content.

Excelsior. August 28/93. San Diego Arroja Aguas Negras a las Playas de Tijuana. By Rocio Galvan.

FBIS-LAT, 93-221, 18 NOV 93, p. 23: Mexico City XEW Television, GMT 0508, November 18, 1993.

FBIS-LAT, 94-011, 18 JUN 94, p. 28: Paris AFP, GMT 2046, January 17, 1994.

FBIS-LAT, 94-021, 1 FEB 94, p. 8: Paris AFT, GMT 1421, January 26, 1994.

FBIS-LAT, 94-011 18 JAN 94, p. 28: Paris, El Tiempo, GMT 2046, January 17, 1994.

FBIS-LAT, 93-108, 8 JUN 93, p. 20: Mexico City XHTV television Network 0200 GMT 3 Jun,93 Salinas Evaluates Campaign Against Drugs.

FBIS-LAT, 93-116, 18 JUN 93, p. 12: Mexico City Canal 13 1300 GMT 17 Jun 93. President Salinas Sign Decree on Drug Enforcement Institute.

FBIS-LAT, 93-129, 8 JUL 94, p. 8: Mexico City XHTV Television network.0200 GMT 6 Jul 93. President Salinas Swears In National Institute To Fight Drug's.

FBIS-LAT, 93-108, 8 JUN 93, p. 20: Mexico City XHTV television Network 0200 GMT 3 Jun,93. Salinas Evaluates Campaign Against Drugs.

FBIS-LAT, 93-196, 13 OCT 93, p. 5: Mexico City NOTIMEX 2128 GMT 6 Oct 93. Armed Forces Begin 'Extensive' Counternarcotics Operations.

FBIS-LAT, 94-043, 4 March 94, p. 12: Mexico City UNOMASUNO. 1 March 94. p.6. Legislators on Water Treaty With US By Jorge Octavio Ochoa.

FBIS-LAT, 93-199, 18 OCT 94, p. 27: Mexico City Canal 13 Television, 1300 GMT October 15, 1993.

FBIS-LAT, 93-196, 13 OCT 93, p. 14: Mexico City Television Canal 13, GMT 1300, October 11, 1993.

FBIS-LAT, 94-011, 18 JAN 94, p. 22: Madrid EFE, GMT 1929, January 15, 1994.

FBIS-LAT, 93-183, 23 SEP 93, p. 14: Mexico City Channel 13 Television, GMT 1319, September 22, 1993.

FBIS-LAT, 93-099, 25 MAY 93, p. 9: Tegucigalpa, Honduras. Voz de Honduras Network 1145 GMT 24 May, 93.

FBIS-LAT, 93-211, 3 NOV 93, p.21: Mexico City NOTIMEX 0219 GMT October 31/93. Senator Says US Politicians Use Mexicans as Scapegoats.

FBIS-LAT, 94-036, 23 FEB 94, p. 10: Mexico City NOTIMEX, GMT 2108, February 18, 1994.

FBIS-LAT, 93-101, 27 May 93, p. 11: Mexico City NOTIMEX 0542 GMT 26 MAY 93. Serrano Blames Crisis on Drug Traffickers.

FBIS-LAT, 93-091-A, 13 May 93, p. 11: Mexico City 11 April/93. EL FINANCIERO By Fernando Castillo. Clinton Administration Impasse on Drugs.

FBIS-LAT, 94-053, 18 MAR 94, p. 16: Mexico City NOTIMEX, GMT 1523, March 14, 1994.

FBIS-LAT, 94-038, 25 FEB 94, p. 11: Mexico City, XEW Television, GMT 0435, February 24, 1994.

FBIS-LAT, 94-028, 25 FEB 94, p. 1: Lima, Peru. El Peruano. 14 Feb 94 p.B1. International Office Created to Combat Drug Trafficking.

FBIS-LAT, 93-224, 23 NOV 93, p. 23: Rio de Janeiro, O Globo, November 19, 1993, p. 6.

FBIS-LAT, 93-196, 13 OCT 93, p. 14: Mexico City Canal 13. 1300 GMT 12 Oct 93. Newcastle: Buenos Días México.

FBIS-LAT, 93-196, 13 OCT 93, p. 14: Mexico City Canal 13, GMT 1300, October 12, 1993.

FBIS-LAT, 93-193, 7 OCT 93, p. 11: Mexico City Canal 13, GMT 1333, October 5, 1993.

Federal Strategy for Drug Abuse and Drug Traffic Prevention 1979. The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1976.

Foreign Affairs 66, No 1 (Fall 1984): pp 62-76. The New Challenge.

GAO June 1988, Drug Interdiction. Operation Autumn Harvest: A National Guard-Customs Anti-Smuggling Effort.

GAO/NSIAD-88-156: DOD's Role in Drug Interdiction.

GAO/NSIAD-90-133: Drug Control.

Gilman, Benjamin, A. (R) from New York. Committee of Foreign Affairs. The Camarena Investigation. July 17, 1986.

Gonzalez, Guadalupe. *The Drug Connection in US-Mexican Relations*.

Hartlyn, Jonathan, Schoultz, Lars, and Vargas, Augusto. *The United States and Latin America in the 1990's: Beyond the Cold War*.

Headline Series. No 290. Fall 1989. Merrill Collett. The Cocaine Connection. Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. p.65.

Kleiman, Mark A.R.. Against Excess. Drug Policy for Results.

KSMS Channel 67. Univision. by Maria Elena Salinas. California. Tierra Prohibida.

Leddy, Edward F.. Magnum Force Lobby. University Press of America.

Leonidas Gomez O. Cartel Historia de la Droga. p. 202 See also: El Tiempo. Bogotá Colombia. January 11, 1990.

Lowenthal, Abraham F., Rediscovering Latin America.

Lowenthal, Abraham F., Latin America: Ready for Partnership?

Mabry, Donald J. The Latin American Narcotics Trade and US National Security.

McDonald, Scott B. Mountain High, White Avalanche. Cocaine and Power in the Andean States and Panama.

Mexico City La Jornada, February 28, 1994.

Mexico City EXCELSIOR STATES Section 30 Jul 93.

Mexico City NOTIMEX 0035 GMT. 30 Sept 93. Solana Meets Christopher, Sees "Positive" US Relations.

Mexico City EXCELSIOR 5 August 93 pp 3A1, 3A4. By Rafael Medina. Cocaine Base Disguised as Cream Cheese Seized.

Mexico City EXCELSIOR 29 Jul 93 pp 2-A1, 2-A-6. By Rafael Medina Cruz. PGR Investigating Money Laundering in Guanajuato.

Mexico City, EXCELSIOR STATES Section. 26 Jul 93 pp 1, 4 y Correspondent Cesar A. Renteria. Nayarit Town Claimed Money Laundering Center.

Mexico City, La Jornada, March 9, 1994, pp. 1,52.

Mexico City XEW Television 0430 GMT Nov 11/93. 24 Horas newscast: Mexican Politician React to Gore-Perot Debate.

Mexico City EXCELSIOR 26 Jun 93 pp 7-A, 14-A By Luis Pazos Drugs; The Wrong Road?

Mexico City XEQ Canal 9 television. 02:00 GMT Oct 12, 93.

Mexico City UNOMASUNO 18 Jun 93 pp 1, 7. By Arnaldo Cordova commentary: "A Mistaken Fight".

Mexico City, La Jornada, December 16, 1993.

Mexico City. Excelsior. March 4/88.

Mexico City, Ultimas Noticias. August 25/93. Agentes del FBI se Introducen Ilegalmente a México: PFCRN.

Mexico City Canal 13 1300 GMT 8 Jun, 93. Report by Juan Manuel Pereira. Attorney General Comments on Drug Investigations.

Mexico City, El Herald. August 24/93. By Porfirio Quiroga Garcia. Protestas por la Intervención del FBI en Ciudad Juárez.

Mexico City El Financiero, March 14, 1994.

Mexico City La Prensa, July 22, 1993.

Mexico City. LA JORNADA. September 9/93. p.A1.

Mexico City UNOMASUNO 12 Jun 93 p 1,7. By Jaime Sanchez Susarrey. Let's Debate Legalization.

Mexico, City. EXCELSIOR September 15/93. p.A1.

Monterey Herald, September 20, 1993.

Monterey Herald, October 17, 1994, p. 13a.

Monterrey, Nuevo Leon. Mexico. El Norte de Monterrey. Dec 15/92.

Moore, John Norton. NATIONAL SECURITY LAW. Pag 17. S. Hoffmann, Dead Ends: American Foreign Policy in the New Cold War.

New York Times. Feb 18/94. p. A15. Abroad at Home. Political Crime. By Anthony Lewis.

New York Times, January 3, 1994.

New York Times. Feb 17/94.

New York Times. Feb 2/94 p.A8. By John Nordheimer. Asbury Park Mayor Held on Drug-Buying Charge.

New York Times. Feb 2/94. Michael T. Kaufman. An Addict Who Took Road Back.

New York Times. Feb 18/94. P A15. Anthony Lewis. Abroad at Home. Political Crime.

New Yorker, May 16/94. By Alma Guillermo-prieto. Zapata's Heirs.

New York Times. Feb 18/94. P A15. Anthony Lewis. Abroad at Home. Political Crime.

Novedades. Oct 22/93. p13A. By Juan Ruiz Healy. A Fondo.

Ojeda, Mario. The Future of Mexico-US Relations. In US-Mexico Relations: Economic and Social Aspects.

Paz, Octavio. Mexico y los Estados Unidos: Posiciones y Contraposiciones. September 29, 1978.

Plan Nacional de Desarrollo. Secretaria de la Presidencia de la República. 1989-1994.

Polich, J. Michael, Ellickson. Strategies for Controlling Adolescent Drug Use. Rand Corporation.

President's Commission on Organized Crime: America's Habit.

Purcell, Susan Kaufman. Mexico in Transition. Implications for US Policy. Essays from Both Sides of the Border. April, 1988.

Reuter, P.H. Money from Crime: A study of Economics of Drug Dealing in Washington D.C. A Bibliography of Selected RAND Publications. 1992. p. 10.

Reuter, Peter, Haaga, John. A Rand Note. N-2830-NIJ. The Organization of High-Level Drug markets: An Exploratory Study. Feb. 1989.

Reuter, Peter. A Rand Note N-2818-USDP. Can the Borders Be Sealed?. August 1988.

Reuter, Peter. Eternal Hope: America's International Narcotics Efforts. February 1985.

Reyna, Jose Luis. Narcotics as a Destabilizing Force for Source and Non Source Countries.

Richard H. Ullman. International Security. Redefining Security. p.130.

Riding, Alan. Distant Neighbors. A portrait of the Mexicans.

Ripley, Randall B. and Lindsay, James M. Congress resurgence. Foreign and Defense Policy on Capitol Hill.

Roett, Riordan. Mexico's External Relations in the 1990's.

Roger Lee was a "political wizard and drug abuser at the same time". San Jose Mercury News. March 27/94. pp1A, 28A. By Brandon Bailey and Barry Witt. The Two Lives of Roger Lee.

Rosenthal, A.. # Andean Leaders and Bush Pledge Drug Cooperation. New York Times, 16 february 1990.

San Francisco Herald. Sat/April/94.

San Jose Chronicle. pp. ,A10,14. By Trina Kleist. Mexican Rebel's Colorful Past.

Shenkman, Richard, "I Love Paul Revere, Whether He Rode or Not.

Tannenbaum, Frank. Mexico: The Struggle for Peace and Bread.

Thomas, V. C. Terrors on Patrol. Sea Power (May 1990).

Tindall, George B. America. A Narrative History.

Treverton, Gregory F. Antinarcotics Strategies and US Latin American relations.

Turner, Charles F., Miller, Heather G. AIDS: Sexual Behavior and Intravenous Drug Use.

Ulman, Richard H. New Thinking About Security. Redefining Security.

United States-Mexican Cooperation Efforts in Narcotics Control Efforts July 17, 1986.

Univision. May 14/94. By Armando Guzman. Peru and Bolivia Increase their Drug Production.

Univision. May 10/94. By Lourdes Menuza. Racial discrimination in the Smithsonian Institution.

Univision. May 4/94. Teresa Rodriguez. Primera persona.

Univision. May 10/94. By Luis Megid from Sacramento.

Univision. KSMS Channel 67. May 5/94. 04:00 GMT. Tierra Prometida. Tierra Prohibida. By Maria Antonieta Collins. 04:00 GMT.

Univision. May 19/94. Maria Antonieta Collins.

UNOMASUNO Dec. 7/93. By Rodolfo Medina. No Contamos con Pruebas para Arrestar a los Jefes que Distribuyen la Droga en EU.

UNOMASUNO. By Ernesto Zavaleta. p10. The Representative Robert Torricelli (D) New Jersey.

US News & World Report. May 4/92. By Linda Robinson in Miami. Lobby Group's.

US Department of State. Bureau of International Narcotics Matters. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. March 1989.

US Department of State Report, 1990: International Narcotics Control.

Vanidades de Mexico. Año 34 Numero 8. p.98.

Walt, Stephen M. The Origins of ALLIANCES. Balancing and Bandwagoning.

Washington Post. February 26/88. p.A25. By William Birnigan. "Mexico Cracks
Armas, Drug Trafficking Ring.

Weigert, Hans, Principles of Political Geography.

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

- | | |
|---|---|
| 1. Defense Technical Information Center
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia, 22304-6145 | 2 |
| 2. Library, Code 52
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000 | 2 |
| 3. Dr. Thomas Bruneau, Code NS/Bn
Chairman, National Security Affairs Department
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000 | 1 |
| 4. Dr. Donald Abenheim, Code NS/Ah
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000 | 1 |
| 5. Dr. Thomas Bogenschild, Code NS/Bc
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943-5000 | 1 |
| 6. Captain Joaquin Garcia Silva
Rincon Del Cielo No. 66-2
Bosq. Residencial Del Sur
Deleg. Xochimilco
Mexico DF CP 16010
Mexico | 5 |